10th Anniversary Conference of the International Luxembourg Forum on Preventing Nuclear Catastrophe "Topical Issues of Nuclear Non-Proliferation". Paris, October 9-10, 2017

Opening Statement

President of the Luxembourg Forum

Paris, October 9^th, 2017

Ladies and Gentlemen, Colleagues, Friends!

Allow me to thank you all for taking part in this conference, held to mark the anniversary of the Luxembourg Forum. Let me remind you that this Forum was established in May 2007 following a conference held in Luxembourg that brought together more than 50 leading international experts from 14 different states, many of whom are now members of the Forum’s Supervisory Board.

The world’s 11 most eminent international organizations dealing with nuclear issues are with us here today, and we will be introducing their leaders and representatives to you over the course of the conference.

Since the very outset, the Forum’s main objectives have been to analyse the most pressing problems relating to the regime of nuclear non-proliferation, to the nuclear arms limitation and reduction processes, to regional nuclear and missile crises, especially in Iran and North Korea, to security of nuclear materials and to the prevention of nuclear terrorism.

In order to do so, over the last 10 years we have organized more than 25 conferences and roundtables involving the world’s most renowned international institutions.

The results of our work have always been presented to the leaders of key states, the UN, the IAEA and other international organizations through declarations and statements containing concrete proposals and recommendations for managing critical situations. We usually receive a response.

Since the Forum’s inception, 24 books and brochures have been published and disseminated.

Along this path we have met with both successes and setbacks. For instance, in December 2015, following a joint conference in Washington of the Luxembourg Forum and the Nuclear Threat Initiative, a well-reasoned Joint statement was sent to the Presidents of the USA and Russia urging them to resume negotiations on the further reduction of strategic nuclear weapons. This drew prompt, but diverging responses. As early as in January of the following year, Washington reiterated its proposal to reduce the number of these weapons by about a third, whereas Moscow set out the reasons standing in the way of a new treaty.

Our proposals have at times been met with only vague responses from a number of addressees. This may be because our arguments were not convincing enough.

We will do better. The members of the Forum’s Supervisory Board will see to that. The Board is made up of distinguished political figures and scientists of international renown. They are all well known to you. Unfortunately, the Board has also lost some of its members. The academician Nikolai Laverov, an outstanding scientist and administrator has passed away. Ever since his time as Deputy Prime-Minister of the Soviet Union and Vice-President of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Nikolai had a perfect grasp of all the ins-and-outs of nuclear matters. Also, due to an excessive workload, one of the founders of the Forum, Mohammed ElBaradei, the former head of the IAEA and one-time presidential candidate in Egypt, is unable to continue his activities as a member of the Supervisory Board.

But its ranks are also being replenished. This year, Henry Kissinger joined the Board, and we are certain that he will make a significant contribution to enhancing the Forum’s work.

Every year, the members of the Supervisory Board provide a rather critical assessment of the Forum’s work and recommend relevant issues for further analysis. That is why we can always hope to work more effectively.

That is the current state of the Luxembourg Forum.

I believe I must point out that 2017 has been marked by a previously unimaginable level of uncertainty in almost all areas that fall within the remit of the Luxembourg Forum and its fellow international organizations. Just take this example: next year, the U.S. and Russia are supposed to complete the reduction of their strategic weapons, in accordance with the New START Treaty signed in Prague; however, for the first time in the history of the two nuclear super-powers’ mutual relations, negotiations on further reducing nuclear arsenals are bogged down in stagnation.

Tensions have been mounting due to mutual grievances concerning the implementation of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. The joint program on surplus plutonium has been frozen, and the joint work of nuclear scientists has been suspended.

Washington is highly critical of the nuclear agreement with Iran, whereas Teheran is threatening to withdraw from the agreement and to resume its weapons programme. The situation on the Korean peninsula is ever tenser and has hit a critical peak due to Kim Jong-Il’s nuclear and missile provocations.

Past experience clearly shows that without negotiations on the limitation of strategic weapons based on the balance of nuclear forces, an uncontrollable arms race towards this most destructive weapon becomes inevitable.

However, it is often said that the relations between Russia and the U.S. in this field are non-existent, but that is an exaggeration. So far, the Prague New START Treaty, which is due to expire in 2021, has been being fully implemented. Every year, the parties carry out dozens of on-site inspections of the other’s land-based launch pads, submarine missile-carriers, heavy bombers, and exchange hundreds of verifiable notifications about the state of their nuclear forces. And there have been no mutual recriminations whatsoever!

Reliable information has emerged about consultations having started on extending the Prague Treaty by 5 years, a possibility foreseen by the Treaty’s text. But it would be far better to sign a new Treaty on the further reduction of strategic nuclear forces.

The main priority now is to preserve the open-ended Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate and Short-Range Missiles, the parties having accumulated mutual grievances concerning compliance with its provisions. Already there are signs that the treaty might be repudiated. The USA appears ready to start preparing to produce weapons types that are prohibited under the INF Treaty.

Terminating this treaty could spell disastrous consequences for Europe, Russia and the United States, because the reasons that compelled the parties to sign it in 1987 carry even more weight in today’s new conditions, threatening all of Europe with a massive nuclear strike. Every so often we hear about fresh consultations aimed at solving the parties’ mutual complaints, but what is really needed is more responsible action from Moscow and Washington.

EU and IAEA leaders welcome the nuclear agreement with Iran and the progress in its implementation, which is reason for optimism concerning the sustainability of the agreement. But that does not mean it isn’t necessary to strictly monitor both its implementation and Iran’s missile programme.

I will not draw out my remarks now by expounding on the situation on the Korean peninsula, you are all aware of it. There will be ample opportunity throughout the conference for views and recommendations on this issue. I would just draw your attention once again to history, which has shown that attempts to placate aggressive, totalitarian regimes tend to lead to catastrophic consequences.

In sum, it must be underscored that, as things stand now, the global situation will in no way help strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime or encourage more joint and closely coordinated actions by leading states to prevent nuclear terrorism.

From what I understand, participants of our conference have concrete proposals to make for addressing the challenges in these fields, which is why I wish us every success.

Once again, I would like to thank all of you for coming to this conference.

Thank you for your attention.

PROGRAM

10^th Anniversary Conference of the International Luxembourg Forum

on Preventing Nuclear Catastrophe

“Topical Issuesof Nuclear Non-Proliferation”

(October 9-10, 2017, Hotel Four Seasons George V, 31 Avenue George V, 75008 Paris, France)

List of Participants

10^th Anniversary Conference of the International Luxembourg Forum

on Preventing Nuclear Catastrophe

"Topical Issues of Nuclear Non-Proliferation"

(October 9-10, 2017,Hotel Four Seasons George V, 31, Avenue George V, 75008 Paris, France)

Press conference of the participants of the 10th anniversary conference of the International Luxembourg Forum

Paris, October 9, 2017

Viatcheslav Kantor.Ladies and gentlemen, representatives of the media. Thank you for taking an interest in our conference which we are holding on the 10th anniversary of the Luxembourg Forum. The Forum was set up as a result of a conference held in Luxembourg in May 2007 that brought together more than 50 leading international experts from 14 different states, many of whom are now members of the Forum’s Supervisory Board

Taking part in today's conference are senior officials and representatives from 11 of the most eminent international organizations dealing with nuclear issues. Since the very outset, the Forum’s main objectives have been to analyse the most pressing problems relating to the regime of nuclear non-proliferation, to the nuclear arms limitation and reduction processes, to regional nuclear and missile crises, especially in Iran and North Korea, to security of nuclear materials and to the prevention of nuclear terrorism.

It is precisely for the purposes of analysing these issues that we have organised over the past ten years some twenty-five conferences and roundtables involving the world’s most renowned international organisations. Our analyses have always resulted in declarations and addresses to the leaders of the main states concerned, the UNO, IAEA and other international agencies, with concrete proposals and recommendations aimed at addressing critical situations. As a rule, we have always received responses to our proposals - and the reaction has been very quick and in the form of direct action.

The Supervisory Board includes outstanding and world-famous politicians and scientists. I am sure you know them and will recognise them sitting here around the table. This year Henry Kissinger became a member of the Board.

In 2017 we are expecting the following significant developments. A considerable growth in uncertainty in virtually all the areas that fall within the remit of the Luxembourg Forum. Next year USA and Russia should complete the reduction of their strategic weapons under the Prague START Treaty; that said, for the first time in the history of relations between the two nuclear super-powers, we note a lengthy stagnation in negotiations on further reductions in nuclear arsenals.

Tensions have been mounting due to mutual grievances concerning the implementation of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. The joint program on surplus plutonium has been frozen, and the joint work of nuclear scientists has been suspended.

Washington has harshly criticised the nuclear agreement with Iran. Teheran, in its turn, is threatening to withdraw from the agreement and resume its weapons program. The situation on the Korean peninsula is ever tenser and has hit a critical peak due to Kim Jong-Il’s nuclear and missile provocations.

Past experience clearly shows that without negotiations on the limitation of strategic weapons based on the balance of nuclear forces, an uncontrollable arms race to acquire this most destructive weapon becomes inevitable.

It is a good thing that, so far at least, the Prague START Treaty, which expires in 2021, is being implemented in full. Every year, the parties carry out dozens of on-site inspections of the other’s land-based launch pads, submarine missile-carriers, heavy bombers, and exchange hundreds of verifiable notifications about the state of their nuclear forces. And there have been no mutual recriminations whatsoever!

There is also information about consultations being initiated as to extending the Prague treaty for a further five years. But it would be far better to sign a new Treaty on the further reduction of strategic nuclear forces.

An essential challenge is maintaining the open-ended Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate and Short-Range Missiles, the parties having accumulated mutual grievances concerning compliance with its provisions. Already there are signs that the treaty might be repudiated. The USA appears ready to start preparing to produce weapons types that are prohibited under the INF Treaty. The termination of this Treaty could entail disastrous consequences for Europe, Russia and USA, because the reasons that compelled the parties to sign it in 1987 carry even more weight in today’s new conditions, threatening all of Europe with a massive nuclear strike. Every so often we hear about fresh consultations aimed at solving the parties’ mutual complaints, but what is really needed is more responsible action from Moscow and Washington.

I am sure that everyone is well versed in the situation on the Korean peninsula. The analysis of proposals on this subject will be reflected in the course of our conference. But I should just like to draw your attention to historical experience, which confirms that attempts to appease aggressive totalitarian regimes usually lead to disastrous consequences.

In general terms, it must be underscored that, as things stand now, the global situation will in no way help strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime or encourage more joint and closely coordinated actions by leading states to prevent nuclear terrorism. Our conference participants have concrete proposals to address problems and issues in these areas. You will be able to assess the results of the conference when it is over.

I thank you.

Vladimir Dvorkin. You now have the possibility of asking questions. Preferably addressed to individual speakers. Yes - please, over there.

Question.Good afternoon., RTVi TV company, a question to Mr Kantor.First question. For the past ten years you have been submitting final documents to the leadership of the super-powers, which you mention on numerous occasions every time the Forum meets. My question is in connection with the Iran agreement: is there in fact any sense, in your view, in putting forward recommendations against the backdrop of Donald Trump’s wish to withdraw from the agreement – and what do you think your chances are – your Forum’s chances - of dissuading the US president from doing so?

And a question for Mr Perry, former US Secretary for Defense. What is behind Trump’s position? Why is it that Donald Trump wants to pull out of the agreement on Iran’s nuclear program now? Thank you.

Viatcheslav Kantor.In general, I see your question as a very positive assessment of the reputation enjoyed by the Luxembourg Forum. Your question as to whether a recommendation by the Luxembourg Forum could influence President Trump by the very way it is formulated is very complimentary for the Luxembourg Forum.

You know - the actions of any NGO have the aim of influencing public opinion in civil society and government circles. If the boiling point in public opinion reaches the right intensity, any action becomes effective.

We believe that over these last ten years the Luxembourg Forum has taken on cutting-edge topicality. Only today I was talking with the founding fathers of the Forum: ten years ago they argued that the very name of the Luxembourg Forum is in essence inappropriate, i.e. we shouldn’t have debated the threat of nuclear catastrophe at the time. But today they are arguing the exact opposite and talking of our foresight, that the threat will continue to grow. Things have turned out exactly so.

We therefore believe that we should be infecting President Trump with our concern about the future of the world and the future of global security. It is precisely for this reason that we will offer very concrete proposals and arguments. So as not to leave Russia and USA one to one with each other, we have agreed today that we will forward the final declaration and our proposals for the two super-powers also to the Chairman of the People’s Republic of China, because in today’s world the interests focusing on the Korean peninsula will to a large extent determine the future of nuclear security. This is a context in which the Chinese presence will be very significant - that much should be clear to all.

But at this point I should like to hand over to Bill Perry.

William Perry. First of all, let me say, I do not agree with President Trump’s view that we should pull out of the Iran agreement. The question also was why does he want to pull out, and I’m taking his statements at face value, he says he wants to pull out because he believes he can renegotiate a better agreement. I think this is a fallacy, a better agreement is not available. If United States would pull out of the agreement, that would take away any incentive for the Europeans and that people who supported us in sanctions to get the agreement. Without the worldwide sanctions, Iran had no incentive to negotiate. So, we can kill the agreement, which would be a big mistake, but we cannot renegotiate agreement. So I think it’s just a misunderstanding on the part of the President to think that it might be possible to renegotiate the agreement.

Question. Gentlemen, Karen * from * News, and I will remain seated so I won’t disturb the camera crews.

To add to my colleague’s question, the rhetoric surrounding the nuclear power struggle is getting more and more aggressive, the latest being World War Three thrown into this boiling pot. To cut to the chase, do you think that President Trump’s policy is a responsible one, and to be more precise, if he indeed intends to nix the Iran deal, what kind of diplomatic clout will the world have vis-à-vis North Korea?

And Mr. Perry, if I may, the current Secretary of Defense publicly said that the Iran deal is in national interest, and the President obviously thinks otherwise. How do you explain this dynamic and how unusual is it? Thank you.

Vladimir Dvorkin.This is a question for Bill Perry – a carry-over of the question, right? Who are you asking?

Question. To the respective panel. Perhaps Mr. Blix could respond to it, but I would appreciate your comments.

Hans Blix. Well, I agree with Bill Perry about the Iran agreement. I think President Trump talked to the United Nations about the potential use of the organization and thereby supported it, but at the same time criticized it. And now is the occasion when he should realize that negotiations have been going on for years about the Iran agreement, and eventually, when it’s come to conclusions, they bring it to the Security Council for the stamp of approval, for making it legally in force. This is something that they could never do in Lausanne or in Geneva, they can do it in the Security Council, bounding for all members of the Security Council. And if Mr. Trump cares for the authority of the United Nations, then he cannot walk back unilaterally from that agreement. This is one consideration.

Then, I’m a bit puzzled by the rather lonely attitude or lonely position taken, because here is a situation where the President has voiced his great disapproval of agreement and has some support from his Government on this, however he finds almost unanimous international community standing in favor of it. Not Israel, not Netanyahu government maybe, but some of the Israeli military support it, they say that yes, they are concerned about Iran, but they support, they think it would be better to have this agreement than not. And it’s a very-very considerable opinion standing behind this agreement.

William Perry. I will comment on the question about stepping away from World War Three by noting that in World War Two more than fifty million people died. If there were World War Three, we wouldn’t be talking about the number of people dead, we would be talking about the end of our civilization. So this loose talk is abhorrent.

Des Browne. May I with the British voice say something about the Joint Comprehensive Plan or theIran deal? So, we didn’t actually ask everybody around the table today if he supports the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action or the Iran deal, but I would be astonished if there is anyone in our conference who does not support and respect the Iran deal, because it was hard fought, hard won, a great success for multilateral diplomacy, and has worked in the sense that all of the reporting on that deal indicates that Iran is complying with the conditions that were imposed on them by the deal.

So, and being in that position we have pretty good confidence, because as other speakers have indicated, almost the whole of the world, with one or two exceptions, and I’m not entirely sure that those one or two exceptions speak for the knowledgeable people in their countries about it, and support the deal. It is supported by a United Nations Security Council resolution, and it is apparently, we are told, supported by Mr. McMaster, or the General McMaster, I think, the General Mattis, Rex Tillerson, and it’s also, as far as I understand, is supported by the Chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. And it’s certainly supported by the European Union, unanimously. Particularly by the three countries who were involved in the negotiation. By Russia, by China. And there is no one who looks at the potential consequences of it that thinks that without the deal we’ll be in a better position. And it certainly appears to be supported by Iran, which is important.

So, I mean the one question that you wanted to answer and were really interested in is how can one explain why President Trump thinks differently from all of those people. Well, your guess is as good as mine. Well, he does have a habit of saying that “President Obama did that, that’s a bad thing.”

Kim Sengupta.Thank you very much. I’m Kim Sengupta from The Independent newspaper in London. Can I ask the panel, and I’ll leave it up to you whoever wants to answer it, but one to Mr. Perry in a minute. But first of all, speaking of the minutiae of what Mr. Trump might do, is it the case that if he does give it back to Congress, ask Congress to reconsider the JCPOA, that it necessarily would be the end of it, will Congress reimpose sanctions that it came up with?

And the second question, if I may, to Mr. Perry. Mr. Perry, how do you feel as an American about the President of USA whose rhetoric is very difficult to differentiate from Kim Jong-un? And how do you think it debases diplomacy, and do you think it actually potentially damaging as something that will be dismissed as, well, just Trump speaking?

William Perry. Can you please repeat that second question, I didn’t follow it.

Kim Sengupta.Certainly. Mr. Perry, I just wondered how you feel, as a distinguished American statesman, about Mr. Trump, his use of rhetoric over Iran and especially North Korea, when some people may say it’s almost impossible to differentiate between him and Kim Jong-un, given the language being used. And do you think this kind of language can potentially lead to conflict, or do you think it will be dismissed as just Trump speaking.

William Perry. Let me answer that question to the best of my ability. In terms of how I feel, I’m appalled. It’s a simple answer. I wrote an op-ed in Politico just a few days ago, about the question of the rhetoric both from Kim Jong-un and from President Trump, and suggested that that kind of inflammatory rhetoric is very dangerous. Setting aside the political decorum of it, and just looking at the danger of it, it creates the conditions in which we might blunder into some kind of a war. And so therefore it’s very undesirable. It had more to do with what we’ve just seen what it has to do with is whether it can create the condition that might stimulate us or North Korea to go to a war with each other. Such a war would be very disastrous, particularly for South Korea and Japan, who would be in an easy range of North Korea’s nuclear weapons. So, it is very, very dangerous, and I’m appalled.

Vladimir Dvorkin.Colleagues, I feel it would be a mistake to limit our discussion by focussing on the personalities of Trump and Kim Jong-un. There are a lot of other issues. Are there any questions on other matters?

Question.Ilya Kramnik, Lenta.ru. I have a question first of all for Vladimir Dvorkin and also probably for William Perry, both of whom were professionally involved with the military in the past. How justified are continued negotiations on a new strategic offensive weapons treaty in the traditional Washington-Moscow format and the traditional format of the nuclear triad, bearing in mind new technological advances, such as the development of high-precision nuclear and non-nuclear systems, including future space-based ones, as well as of course the development of ABM systems and the growth in the potential of other club members – China and other countries?

Vladimir Dvorkin. I'll try to answer that question briefly, although it really requires an extended commentary. I believe that at the present moment in time there is no alternative to resuming negotiations between Russia and USA. All the more so, since Russia is insistently pressing for an extension of the Prague START Treaty. It would of course be better to conclude a new treaty, as has already been said, but I think if they manage to extend it for a further five years, then over that period reason will prevail in the relations between the two states, or at least on this issue.

Transforming all of it into three-way talks I believe would be a dead-end. You only have to think of how many inspections there are already between Russia and USA, how many verification visits and so on - just try to imagine how many there would be in a three-way arrangement! Moreover, it would take five years to negotiate. That’s not to mention making it a five-way process, just limiting it to the big five.

The issues constraining talks on the Russian side – ABMD, a disarming strike – all these are arguments belonging to the political arena, not to hard security. Independent experts have long since demonstrated that there is no ABMD that could repel an all-out attack. They can only hold off a limited strike…Even an ABMD with massive resources, I would say, could counter only limited, one-off missiles in several strikes, such systems are not capable of more than that. It’s also been proved that a disarming conventional strike can’t influence the balance of forces either. This is it in a nutshell.

Your question please,Viktor Litovkin.

Question. Thank you very much. Viktor Litovkin, TASS. Mr. Dvorkin, we have heard at today's conference a lot of convincing arguments in favour of the need to hold talks between Washington and Moscow aimed at further reducing strategic nuclear offensive weapons and in general of concentrating more on nuclear issues. What is it that has been hampering such talks ever since 2011? Is it the ambitions of the leaders, a lack of trust, a sort of aggressive policy pursued by one or the other party? Or is it the risk of either one acquiring a unilateral advantage in the military sphere? Thank you.

Vladimir Dvorkin. Viktor, you have already answered your own question, when you talk about ambitions, distrust – that is what has reared its head in response to the position of both Russia and the US. You’ve already answered. Who can add anything to that? Mr. Lukin, what has been responsible for putting the brakes on all these talks?

Vladimir Lukin.The political situation and the absence of political will on the part of the main participants in the process have certainly been influential factors. There are people who, for whatever reason, believe that such talks are not timely inasmuch as they don’t give enough time for modernising armed forces; others believe that they are impossible, because the other side behaves badly, i.e. not in the way the counterparty would prefer. All kinds of reservations and other issues proliferate, and meanwhile both parties, plus a third, China, are undergoing a devastating defeat in the virtual war by North Korea, which is gaining a brilliant victory over us all. That’s it in a nutshell.

Question. I’m sorry, Daphne Benoit, Agence France-Presse, wire service. I have a question regarding the treaty that was signed last summer at the UN, abolishing, like, basically just simply forbidding nuclear arms. It was welcomed by a few experts that are actually in your panel, but on the other hand, some others are just saying that this treaty is completely nonsense and useless, as long as the nuclear states haven’t signed for it and won’t. You know, a French expert told me that he thought it was the new Briand–Kellogg Pact of the 21^st century, meaning that it was completely useless. What’s your take on it, please?

Jayantha Dhanapala.I think you will find different views in the panel about that treaty. Many of us, especially coming from non-aligned countries, welcomed it. 122 countries voted for it on the 7^th of July. And already the treaty has entered into force, because it required only 50 signatures for it to enter into force. But of course this is to have a normative ban on weapons and make it outlawed, beyond the pale of international law, which is the effect that the biological weapons treaty as well as the chemical weapons treaty have had. So, all three categories of weapons of mass destruction are theoretically banned and outlawed. But it does not mean that we have got rid of nuclear weapons. Indeed, we have still not got rid of chemical weapons either, but we are proceeding with the elimination of chemical weapons to verification.

There is no agreement with regard to nuclear weapons, because the nine countries which possess these weapons are not giving them up, and they oppose the treaty, and indeed are, I’m told, pressurizing countries who signed for the treaty of 7^th of July not to sign it. But I think the treaty has entered into effect, and we must now try to move from the dialog of the deaf between the nuclear-weapon-armed countries and the non-nuclear-weapon states. Otherwise the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, which is the most widely subscribed to treaty, is in danger of collapsing.

Rolf Ekeus.What I’d like to share with everyone, and to declare, are we to live with the nuclear weapons forever? I think Bill Perry has already explained the consequences of using nuclear weapons, and that is not excluded. How stupid can you be? Do you believe that we have nuclear weapons and they will not be used because of “deterrence”? We frighten each other, the more weapons we have; the more we frighten each other, the less we are likely to use these weapons? I think this is a very peculiar way of thinking about this matter. These are the ultimate threat for the existence of humanity, because of the violence which can be rendered about with these weapons.

And then certainly we have already the nuclear Non-proliferation treaty, which makes very clear that the ambition is that the nuclear weapons should be given up. And at least five permanent nuclear-weapon states support that treaty. So we already win acceptance of Article 6 of that treaty and the overall preambular arrangements that weapons should be given up, so it is rather pathetic negative attitude to build our existence on “I threaten with a weapon, and if you threaten me, I will threaten you.” And this is a matter… These arrangements are not safe to us, as also Bill Perry has repeatedly lectured on, and I hope we will have a chance to listen to him on that.

Hans Blix.President Kantor spoke a while ago about the civil society, and our Luxembourg group is part of the civil society within the civil society. And I think here we have a case where you can see that international civil society has been acting and has been very successful. Not only the people, but also the governments. I think we can see this new ban treaty as a scream of agony by a majority of states in the world that the nuclear-weapons states have not succeeded in moving forward with nuclear disarmament. The argument that the Ban Treaty should be in contradiction to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, I think, does not really hold water. The nuclear-weapons states are not committed to do away with their nuclear arms. They are not bound by this new treaty. And the architecture of the entity is one in which the non-nuclear countries commit themselves not to acquire nuclear weapons, and the five high and mighty nuclear-weapons states commit themselves to disarm, to negotiate towards disarmament, and this is not what has taken place.

The value of the new ban lies in its helping to build a norm against nuclear weapons. And it is not so insignificant. I think if they were not worried about it, the norm could really come into being, they would not oppose it so much.

Let me evoke an example, namely in 1925, the Geneva Protocol was adopted, prohibiting the use of chemical weapons and bacteriological weapons. That was in 1925. I think it took about thirty years before the United States ratified it. And gradually, through the aversion to chemical weapons, the public opinion was stronger and stronger against it, and by the 1970s it probably was regarded as customary international law. And that was the way the world looked upon the use of chemical weapons in Syria, even before the Syrian government has joined the C-Weapons Convention. So, gradually the international community builds a value and a norm, and this is what we are seeing.

William Perry.I supported the treaty, because I saw it as an important statement of principle. I didn’t expect immediate results from it, but this is an important statement of principle. I compare it, for example, to 1776, when the American Continental Congress stated, “All men are created equal.” At the time they stated that, in the United States slavery was legal, women could not vote, and many-many things beside that. That’s crazy, women are not equal in this country. But it was the statement of principle, and over the decades, we worked closer and closer to that principle. I look at that in that same light. It’s a principle that we should take seriously, believe in, and try to work towards.

Des Browne. Can I just say a few words to support this argument that it is far too early to be concluding what the effect of this treaty will be. And there are many contemporary examples of treaties; we don’t have to go back, as far as lessons that history may have, in order to find examples of this. So, let me just give you some examples.

So, the International Criminal Court Treaty. United States never joined it. For almost twenty years it’s really paid for it. And it goes around the world effecting everybody with it. So, I mean, it’s become a norm of the United States in terms of the way in which it conducts its international diplomacy.

The Convention on Cluster Munitions. They didn’t join that either, but they think more than hard now about using them, and I don’t think they have used them since that was passed. You know, and with exceptions which are challenging for everybody about the Korean Peninsula, hardly anybody in sovereign terms uses antipersonnel landmines now, although not everybody signed up to the treaty.

So these norms can establish very-very quickly, and I’m not just suggesting that that’s what happened. You know, that’s what will happen. But something really interesting has already happened. And that is that the ICAN organization was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. Now, in Europe that’s significant. Because there are lots of countries in Europe that are very proud of their association with the Nobel Peace Prize, and some of them are NATO allies. So they going to have to think well and hard in terms of the domestic attitude towards this treaty. Whether they respect the Peace Prize, or whether they go with what their allies, who want to continue to have nuclear weapons, want them to say. That may not become apparent for a long period of time, but it will have an effect, particularly on countries who have coalition politics. A significant effect.

So there are all sorts of reasons why this can work. Even if you don’t think it’s the best treaty that was ever made, I don’t think it could’ve been done better.

Question. TASS…

Vladimir Dvorkin.I am sorry, but this must be the last question.

Question.Yes, one last question, if I may, to the President of the Luxembourg Forum, Mr Kantor. If I understand correctly, at this conference the results, as it were, of ten years of work by the Luxembourg Forum are being summarised – but on the other hand, at the same time new horizons are being established – so I should like to know whether the Forum already has any concrete plans for the future – what will it be dealing with in the next ten years, for example – what specific challenges is the Forum faced with? Thank you.

Viatcheslav Kantor.Yes, well, obviously new problems present new challenges and are crucial in determining the outline for the future development of our organisation.

Firstly, though I should just like to give you a few examples. Many political contexts over the past ten years have been changing very significantly. Look how the Ukraine phenomenon has emerged, the Korean peninsula context has come very seriously to the fore, the Middle East and so on and so forth. All of this – the dramatic intensification of the situation in the Middle East included - today the threat of nuclear terrorism is targeting certain locations, i.e. we now realise that this is the most infected region; when we speak of the threats of nuclear terrorism, in this sense it is a toxic region, so all these elements create a new political context which defines the new horizons of the future work of the Luxembourg Forum.

Very dangerous, new trends are appearing. Only today, for example, we were talking about the fact that military officials who are linked to the most senior of political circles in a number of countries in their rhetoric have recently started referring to devising a concept of limited strategic nuclear war. This is a dangerous symptom and clearly the Luxembourg Forum will have to take a long look at the problem and place on the table, before the politicians in a position to take strategic decisions, the full range of consequences that will ensue from this.

Today Secretary Perry has given us an example of how the world could inadvertently slide to the very brink of a real nuclear war. Today we were shown an extraordinary sci-fi film in which, on the basis of relations between Pakistan and India, a similar potential, hypothetical conflict could be played out. I think this is a promising subject on which the Luxembourg Forum could develop its toolbox. Perhaps we will make similar films on the threat of nuclear terrorism, inasmuch as these threats are not fully understood by many – where they come from and what the scenarios would be like. Although, of course, we should give some thought to ensuring that such properly scripted and situation specific films do not become instruction manuals for terrorists, for there is that danger.

Finally, I should like to conclude with some examples of possible scenarios, possible areas that the Luxembourg Forum might move ahead in. Here we are talking about a profound understanding of the psychology behind the evolution of the threat of nuclear terrorism.

You know, what comes to mind as I listen to the profound analysis of the wise men who make up the Luxembourg Forum is that we have to understand that these individuals are all superstars in their field. They really do deliver – and I do not shirk from the comparison – to the enlightened world the fruit of their wide-ranging wisdom and huge professionalism; they have been doing that throughout the ten years they have been working in the Forum, and we are most grateful to them. But you know, the real analogy, which occurs to me, is that of today’s situation with what happened straight after the end of WWII.

Look, for example, at the fact that it has been acknowledged by now that the Americans achieved no military advantage by attacking Japanese cities. It was an instrument of intimidation or deterrence, a way to exert influence over the psyche of people everywhere on this planet and establish who would define the world-order for future decades. This system is still working to this day. I should not like to see the Korean card being played in a similar key, for the purposes of intimidation, and the Luxembourg Forum will certainly focus on this issue. Because there are such thoughts in the air already. This is one more area we ought to be moving in, in terms of our work in the Forum. I thank you.

Vladimir Dvorkin. It seems to me that we still haven't answered the question; perhaps I could call upon academician Sagdeev to voice his opinion as to the possibility of limitedstrategic nuclear war between nuclear states. Does he think it possible?

Roald Sagdeev.This issue has been discussed as applied to limited nuclear tactical war, and all the experts, including myself, think that the leaders of the nuclear powers back in the times of Gorbachev and Reagan believed that not only was it impossible, but that it was extremely dangerous, because it would almost certainly lead to a global nuclear world war. And that is because the escalation of nuclear strikes is absolutely obvious. This is what we saw today in that very instructive video-film Bill Perry showed us.

I would like to say a few words about the somewhat controversial award of the Nobel Peace Prize. I take the view that there would be nothing to fear if the leaders of the nuclear superpowers were to associate themselves with an agreement of this kind. This would not mean that they would have to immediately and overnight get rid of their nuclear forces. However, it would be a confirmation of the intent that in some senses was already articulated in the Treaty on Non-Proliferation. I believe that Mikhail Gorbachev would have signed up to it straightaway. Thank you.

Vladimir Dvorkin. Statesmen of Mikhail Gorbachev’s stature regrettably no longer exist. Thank you, colleagues. That concludes our press conference today.

FROM ALARM TO ACTION:
GROWING NUCLEAR DANGERS DEMAND CONSTRUCTIVE POLICIES

DECLARATION

of the 10th Anniversary Conference of the International Luxembourg Forum on Preventing Nuclear Catastrophe

The participants of the 10th Anniversary Conference of the International Luxembourg Forum on Preventing Nuclear Catastrophe wish to communicate their extreme concern about the present state of international security.
The causes of this alarm are numerous. We are facing a new and more dangerous era in which the risk of use of nuclear weapons is unacceptably high and growing. Since the end of the Cold War, the number of states possessing nuclear weapons has grown from seven to nine, and still more might acquire them in the future. There are rising tensions between nuclear-armed states. The technology to build nuclear weapons has spread. There are more opportunities for terrorists to acquire the materials needed to build a bomb. North Korea continues testing more powerful nuclear explosive devices and longer-range ballistic missiles and India and Pakistan are in danger of another serious crisis.
Simultaneously, the arms control frameworks regulating and constraining nuclear forces are eroding. The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty is under growing threat due to mutual accusations of non-compliance by Russia and the United States. Since the conclusion of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) seven years ago, strategic arms control dialogue has been nearly nonexistent, producing the longest period without meaningful negotiations in nearly five decades. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) to restrain the Iranian nuclear program, which will help alleviate a pressing proliferation challenge if fully implemented by all parties, is jeopardized. Thus, while dangers persist or increase, sources of restraint weaken or disappear.
Against this background of worrying international tensions, the participants of the 10th Anniversary Conference of the Luxembourg Forum call on all major governments to work together to address these growing concerns. In particular, we see an urgent need for Russia and the United States, given their special obligations, to address together areas of common interest, paramount among them reducing nuclear and other military risks and preventing catastrophic terrorist attacks. The lack of official dialogue on nuclear weapons in today’s world is dangerous and contrary to the interests of both countries.
Therefore, we strongly urge Moscow and Washington to engage in a new nuclear dialogue to re-establish as a core principle the goal of reducing the role and risks of nuclear weapons in global security policies. The dialogue could involve specific steps such as:
• Promoting a new Joint Presidential Declaration confirming that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.
• Calling for other nuclear-armed states to join this declaration.
• Reviving bilateral military-to-military dialogue as an urgent priority.
• Resolving the controversies over compliance with the INF Treaty and ensuring preservation of this key Treaty.
• Extending the term of the current START Treaty and initiating without further delay talks on a follow-on Treaty.
• Increasing US-Russian cooperation in the NPT context, particularly for the 2018 NPT PrepCom and subsequent efforts to prepare for the 2020 NPT Review Conference.
• Resuming cooperation on the safety and security of nuclear materials and facilities as a key step to prevent nuclear terrorism. An important move in this direction would be to promote the universal and full implementation of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material as Amended, which has entered into force, in particular to ensure the security of nuclear material in transport.
The Luxembourg Forum also offered recommendations on a number of issues of wider concern and encourages all interested parties to undertake the following steps:
• The UN Security Council resolutions imposing sanctions on North Korea must be strictly enforced by all parties. As a first step in addressing North Korea’s growing nuclear capabilities, the United States should, after broad consultations with South Korea, People’s Republic of China, Russia and Japan, seek to engage in direct dialogue with North Korea in pursuit of a freeze on nuclear tests and launches of long-range missiles and reciprocal measures. In addition, the Luxembourg Forum favors the resumption of multilateral efforts aimed at achieving the long-term goal of curtailment of military activities, denuclearization and a peaceful settlement on the Korean peninsula. In a region marked by provocative behavior, direct dialogue is urgently needed to reduce the risk of military conflict, to minimize the likelihood of escalation to nuclear war, and to discourage inflammatory words and actions.
• All governments should reaffirm their support for the JCPOA and their intention to ensure its effective implementation.
• Every effort should be undertaken to facilitate the entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.
• To ensure the survival and supply of needed expertise in the future, efforts should be made to foster a new generation of arms control and non-proliferation specialists, including in the future work of the Luxembourg Forum.
In sum, in order to address urgent nuclear risks, preserve nuclear arms control, strengthen global non-proliferation, and deescalate international tensions, the partici pants of the 10th Anniversary Conference of the Luxembourg Forum call on global leaders to implement the steps set out above.

List of Participants

10^th Anniversary Conference of the International Luxembourg Forum

on Preventing Nuclear Catastrophe

Topical Issues of Nuclear Non-Proliferation

(October 9-10, 2017, Hotel Four Seasons George V, 31, Avenue George V, 75008 Paris, France)