Online Conference of the Luxembourg Forum on the New START Treaty. June 4, 2021

Participants of the Luxembourg Forum Online Conference Discuss the New START Prospects

MOSCOW-WASHINGTON, D. C., June 5, 2020. On June 4, 2020, the International Luxembourg Forum on Preventing Nuclear Catastrophe held an online conference focused on the Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (New START).

Conference participants discussed prospects, opportunities, and conditions for extending the Treaty, new weapons systems that could be included in the New START, maintaining predictability in the absence of a new treaty, and opportunities for dialogue about a new arms reduction treaty between the United States, Russia and China if efforts to extend the New START fail, as well as the main parameters of a new treaty.

According to the President of the International Luxembourg Forum on Preventing Nuclear Catastrophe Viatcheslav Moshe Kantor, extending the New START is still possible. “This is the last year that the New START can be extended before its expiration in February 2021. We urge that the Treaty be renewed and that steps toward negotiations on a follow-up agreement be taken. With the necessary political will, it is possible to resolve the technical issues and formulate the definitions that are fundamentally important to preserving the New START. This Treaty remains critical to maintaining bilateral strategic stability, parity, transparency, and predictability in Russia–United States relations.”

“We propose renewing the Treaty not only to preserve the system of inspections, transparency, and predictability. The main goal is buying time to start negotiations on the next treaty on strategic offensive arms. The ten years when the New START was in force were wasted. Now, its extension is vital for us”, said Alexey Arbatov, Head of the Center for International Security at Primakov National Research Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), Russian Academy of Sciences. “I do not expect the START Follow-on to include serious limit reductions, taking into account US bitterness toward China. The limits may be cut symbolically by 100 units because several important systems have come to the fore and become a destabilizing factor. It would be logical to include the Burevestnik long-range intercontinental cruise missile and the Poseidon system in the Treaty because these systems are questionable from the rational point of view.”

“Executing a new treaty is beneficial for Russia, no matter what . Essentially, the equal limits on strategic offensive arms constitute an opportunity to avoid participation in an arms race. However, if [a super-duper missile], as Trump put it, is created, it will fuel an arms race,” emphasized Vladimir Dvorkin, Principal Researcher at the Center for International Security, Primakov National Research Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), Russian Academy of Sciences, Major General (retired). “I do not believe that Poseidon and Burevestnik will hamper treaty renewal, because they still require long-term development and are unlikely to be completed on time by 2026. Russia’s nuclear capacity will not be increased if these two systems are included in the effective military arsenal, regardless of the fact that Russia has already scheduled the building of four Belgorod submarines. If Poseidon and Burevestnik are the only obstacle to concluding a treaty based on the traditional triads, I cannot exclude the possibility that the Russian government may declare that it is not going to deploy these systems in order to maintain balance and the last feature of a nuclear country and preserve room for maneuvering in case of emergency. That is my optimistic scenario.”

Conference participants focused on the prospects for involving China in negotiations on nuclear arms reduction, expressing doubt of the possibility of such a move. “Trump’s team, led by Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Affairs Marshall Billingslea, is convinced that Americans must feel free to develop their weapons if China is not involved, and China will never agree to it. China might participate in negotiations on the condition that the United States and Russia agree to reduce their nuclear capacity to China’s level, but neither Russia nor the United States would accept that condition. The negotiators from the opposite side are quite complicated. Somebody needs to act as an initiator, and then a discussion may start,” said Victor Esin, leading researcher at the Institute for the US and Canadian Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences, former First Deputy Commander-in-Chief, Strategic Missile Forces, and Colonel General (retired).

Participants in the online meeting noted with regret that the previous US administration was more willing to negotiate offensive arms reductions than the Trump administration.

According to Professor of Political Science at Columbia University Robert Legvold, chances of renewing the New START are rapidly approaching zero due to the position of the US administration, which intends to ‘exit all treaties’. But everything can be solved with political will if the parties look for common ground and realistic approaches.

“We are not hearing any proposals or ideas from Washington, and there are reasons for that. If Biden wins the upcoming election, many people in the US establishment will encourage him to extend the New START. I think that the time has come for the United States and Russia to talk about a limitation on all nuclear warheads, deployed and non-deployed, strategic and non-strategic,” said Steven Pifer, senior fellow with the Brookings Institution and former United States Ambassador to Ukraine.

“Regarding the New START extension, the outcome of the election in the United States will influence the process significantly. We have every opportunity to renew the Treaty. If both parties exit the Treaty, it will be a very destructive decision and we will find ourselves in a sticky situation,” thinks Vice President of the Nuclear Threat Initiative Lynn Rusten.

Participants also discussed the release of the new Basic Principles of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence, which state that Moscow may use nuclear weapons in response to the use of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction against it or its allies, as well as in the event of aggression against the Russian Federation with the use of conventional weapons when ‘the very existence of the state is in jeopardy’.

“The possible use of nuclear weapons is alarming only if our missile-attack alarm devices detect the launch of a ballistic missile directed toward Russia, in which case Russia will strike back,” said Dvorkin. “Besides, it is not clear what the likelihood is. It could be high but it is never equal to one. We can talk about likelihood when there have been multiple repetitions of an event,. but a nuclear exchange is not a recurring event. I think it is a mistake to equate the likelihood with one.”

According to Esin, Russia’s new nuclear deterrence policy is a simplified version of the 2010 document with no significant changes. “Aggression against Russia with the use of conventional weapons means aggression inside the Russian Federation, not in the Baltic states, Poland, or other country, and Russia would have to sustain defeat. That would be considered a forced use of nuclear weapons. Additionally, pursuant to Article 11 of the policy, nuclear deterrence is ensured continuously in peacetime and in wartime. Nuclear deterrence serves as the de-escalation instrument.”

The conference was attended by Vladimir Dvorkin, Chairman of the Organizing Committee of the International Luxembourg Forum, Principal Researcher of the Center for International Security of the Primakov National Research Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), Russian Academy of Sciences (RAS), Major General (retired) (Russia);Alexey Arbatov, Deputy Chairman of the Organizing Committee of the International Luxembourg Forum; Head of the Center for International Security at IMEMO, RAS; Academician, RAS (Russia);Lynn Rusten,Vice President of the Nuclear Threat Initiative (USA); George Perkovich, Vice President for Studies, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (USA); Victor Esin, Leading Researcher, Institute for the US and Canadian Studies, RAS, First Vice President of the Academy of Security, Defense and Law and Order, Colonel General (retired) (Russia); Robert Legvold, Professor Emeritus, Department of Political Science and the Harriman Institute, Columbia University (USA); Steven Pifer, non-resident senior fellow with the Brookings Institution, former Senior Adviser with the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C. (USA), and other experts on nuclear security, disarmament, and non-proliferation.