Final Declaration of the Conference of the International Luxembourg Forum "Arms Control: the Burden of Changes". Rome, June 4-5, 2019

The Doomsday Clock on the cover of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists in 2018

was set at two minutes to midnight – for the first time after the end of the Cold War

Arms Control: Burden of Change

The Final Document of the Conference of the International Luxembourg Forum on Preventing Nuclear Catastrophe

Rome, June 5, 2019

The June 4-5 Conference in Rome included the heads of a number of world-renowned international organizations, dedicated to arms control and non-proliferation – the Arms Control Association, Global Zero, the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, the Nuclear Threat Initiative, the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs, the Russian International Affairs Council, and the Asia-Pacific Leadership Network for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament (APLN).

All participants are unanimous in their profound concern at the continuing degradation of strategic stability due to the obvious disintegration of the arms control regimes and the accelerating development of new types of nuclear weapons.

The main manifestations of this crisis are the impending termination of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in 2019, and growing uncertainty related to the future of the New START and the feasibility of a START follow-on after 2021. The viability of the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on curtailment and transparency of the Iranian nuclear program is in grave doubt, with the ensuing risk of yet another armed conflict in the Middle East. There is an increasing possibility that the 2020 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty (NPT) Review Conference will not conclude with an agreed plan of action to strengthen the NPT, with the risk of undermining the integrity of the nuclear non-proliferation regime as a whole.

Worse, this degradation of strategic stability combined with the unraveling of major arms control treaties coincides with the accumulation of major crises and wars throughout the planet, which have the potential for uncontrolled escalation and incalculable risks. The dangers of nuclear catastrophe are currently higher than at any time during the Cold War. The primary danger is not deliberate use of nuclear weapons by any state, but blundering into war through human error, system error, miscommunication or miscalculation, with these risks compounded by new cyber technology. The analogy with the past is not World War II but World War I. With the weapons of that day – machine guns and poison gas – 25 million people were killed. With the nuclear weapons of today, hundreds of millions would be killed, and life on this planet as we know it would be destroyed.

In contrast to the declarations made by the leaderships of the most powerful nations of their desire to avoid an arms race, in fact these nations are gradually becoming involved in nuclear and conventional, offensive and defensive, regional and global, space and cyber arms races. This will encourage further proliferation of nuclear arms and increase the risk of these falling into the hands of terrorist organizations.

For all the complexities of the evolving world order and advanced military technologies, a crucial contribution to this dire situation is the low priority given to arms control by the authorities of the leading nations and their pursuit of destabilizing innovative weapon systems. What is most evident is the unforgivable underestimation of the dangers of the forthcoming uncontrolled, multinational and multifacetous arms race, replacing half a century of nuclear arms control.

In view of these dangerous developments we urge the leaders of the United States and the Russian Federation to prevent the termination of the INF Treaty by urgently negotiating appropriate methods of on-site inspections for removing mutual suspicions of Treaty non-compliance. While such talks proceed, both sides should agree on a moratorium on deployment of weapon systems which are prohibited by the INF Treaty. In parallel, they should initiate talks with China and other nuclear-armed states on effective nuclear risk reduction and arms control measures.

In order to sustain strategic stability, we appeal to the US and Russian leaderships to extend New START for five years beyond 2021 and to commence talks on a follow-on START treaty, which should cover traditional and qualitatively new strategic weapon systems and apply realistic counting rules and reliable verification methods.

With the goal of enhancing the NPT we strongly recommend to the leaderships of the five nuclear-weapon states to apply all efforts to ensure the success of the 2020 Review Conference. Saving the INF Treaty and New START are the first crucial steps towards this goal. The second step would be to preserve the Iran JCPOA, which requires that all parties meet their nuclear and sanctions relief commitments under the deal. The third step should be achieving some progress on the weapons of mass destruction (WMD)-free zone in the Middle East. The fourth is to start a constructive dialogue between nuclear-armed states and non-nuclear-armed states – including the parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons – focusing on practical risk reduction measures including de-alerting, reduced deployments, decreasing stockpiles, and no first use.

Of utmost importance for the enhancement of the global nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear security regime is for all responsible states to further strengthen international treaties and conventions to deter and combat the threat of nuclear terrorism, which requires greater cooperation to achieve the full implementation and universality of relevant international legal instruments. This indisputably is one of the key areas where the national interests of all states converge to ensure security of nuclear materials and facilities. In this context it is vital for the US and Russia to intensify their cooperation to combat nuclear terrorism.

To provide better organizational capacity for strengthening collective efforts we propose the establishment of an international coordination center located in Europe, with a specific mandate on combating the risks of nuclear terrorism. Such a center could involve the participation, on a permanent basis, of representatives from relevant national institutions of states parties with competence in the field of protection and security of radioactive and nuclear materials as well as of nuclear facilities, and could include a capacity for recourse to emergency response forces.

The conference participants noted that the system of contact groups on the highest and other levels, involving ministers, researchers, the military and political scientists, that operated continuously between the two nuclear superpowers, US and Russia, has been disrupted, and this could result in unpredictable consequences. It should be a priority to restore this system.

The conference participants recommend that the Russian Federation and the United States adopt a new declaration reconfirming their belief that nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. Such a declaration has been emphasized by the Luxembourg Forum during the last several years. Under the present circumstances adopting this declaration would serve as a good starting point to move along the “road map” for addressing the issues identified by this conference of the Luxembourg Forum.

The participants of the Conference of the International Luxembourg Forum on Preventing Nuclear Catastrophe: