Final Document of the Conference of the International Luxembourg Forum on Preventing of Nuclear Catastrophe

Final Document of the Conference of the International Luxembourg Forum on Preventing of Nuclear Catastrophe

The 2015 NPT Review Conference and the Regional Non-proliferation Issues

June 9-10, 2015, Stockholm, Sweden

The participants of the Conference express their deep concern with regard to an acute multi-faceted crisis of the whole system and process of nuclear disarmament, arms control, non-proliferation and the overall global and regional security environment.

The most recent manifestation of the crisis is the barren outcome of the 2015 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference, and its failure to adopt a consensus final document. Although the immediate cause of the Conference failure was a disagreement over the recommendations on convening the Conference on the Weapons of Mass Destruction–Free Zone in the Middle East, the deeper roots of the failure stem from the basic disagreement among States Parties on nuclear proliferation and disarmament challenges and how to address them. The NPT review process also suffers from a number of internal and external problems.

The START follow-on talks are deadlocked, as are the talks on ballistic missile defense systems, long-range conventional offensive systems, and sub-strategic nuclear arms. The Fissile Material Cutoff (FMCT) and Outer Space Non-militarization negotiations are similarly stymied. The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) has not entered legal force almost two decades after its signing. The Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) is under growing criticism in the U.S. and Russia. The Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program and other multilateral cooperative efforts to enhance the security of nuclear materials have been curtailed; Russia is not planning to attend the Nuclear Security Summit of 2016. There has been no progress on multilateral nuclear arms control, including among the five permanent members of the UN Security Council (P-5). Many proposals on the enhancement of the NPT regime have not been accepted.

1) The Non-Proliferation Treaty remains the cornerstone of the regime created to prevent further proliferation of nuclear weapons and to promote nuclear disarmament as a central pillar of international security in both global and regional contexts.

The participants of the Luxembourg Forum intensively reviewed the deliberations and outcome of the recently concluded 2015 NPT Review Conference. While lamenting the inability of the Conference to produce a consensus concluding report, they welcomed the positive developments that were achieved in the most recent Review cycle.

While recognizing the difficult international political environment that presently exists, Luxembourg Forum participants expressed hope that improvement in global politics will facilitate meaningful progress in the implementation of the Action Items adopted at the 2010 Review Conference and urged progress across the three pillars of the Non-Proliferation Treaty; these ideas attracted nearly universal support at the 2015 Review Conference, as reflected in near consensus in favor of the draft final document. The Luxembourg Forum participants urged all interested parties to lend their support to reinforce such renewed momentum.

The Luxembourg Forum participants recognize the growing international support for the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons Initiative; for the establishment of an open-ended working group to identify and elaborate effective measures for the full implementation of NPT Article VI; and for the promotion of disarmament and non-proliferation education. The Luxembourg Forum participants also called upon the eight remaining Annex II States to sign and ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty without further delay and without waiting for any other state to do so.

The participants endorse the progress made in recent years on nuclear safety and security and encourage further progress in these domains. They encourage resumption of bilateral US-Russia cooperation on nuclear security and continuation of multilateral efforts in this area, including steps to prevent nuclear terrorism and to stop the transfer and leakage of nuclear materials and technology to non-state actors.

They endorse promoting transparency of states’ nuclear energy programs to provide reassurance that such programs are peaceful and to ensure compliance with best practices in the domains of safety, security and environmental protection.

The Luxembourg Forum participants urge all parties to refrain from undertaking provocative actions with both their nuclear and conventional forces that could result in accidents and inadvertent escalation.

2) The above measures should take place in parallel with the following important disarmament efforts:

· resolving controversies over compliance with the INF Treaty in order to preserve this important disarmament agreement;

· strict implementation of the New START Treaty of 2010;

· resuming US-Russian talks on a follow-on strategic arms reduction agreement, including meaningful limitation of long-range precision guided conventional systems;

· resuming talks on confidence-building measures and possible cooperative elements of US and Russian strategic ballistic missile defense systems and projects;

· initiating consultations on the scope and methods of limiting sub-strategic nuclear arms;

· making efforts to overcome the prolonged deadlock on the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty and non-militarization of Outer Space;

· making efforts to engage other nuclear armed states, in addition to the US and Russia, in the process of nuclear arms limitation;

· promoting greater transparency of nuclear arsenals and programs of nuclear armed states.

3) The participants discussed the diplomatic effort underway to find a credible peaceful option for resolving the nuclear challenge posed by Iran. They examined both the strengths and shortcomings of the framework for a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) unveiled in Lausanne in April 2015.

They underscored the importance of an early diplomatic resolution of this acute challenge to the non-proliferation regime, one that would see Iran effectively and expeditiously reassuring the international community about its peaceful nuclear intentions in return for normalizing its international status. The participants highlighted the importance of having in place a robust verification scheme and transparency measures, including the Additional Protocol and other negotiated arrangements and measures that go beyond traditional Agency Safeguards. They emphasized the need for effective United Nations Security Council sanctions snap-back provisions and noted that it is essential to address outstanding IAEA questions about past nuclear activities (especially the question of possible military dimensions).

They also emphasized the need to encourage Iran to live up to the terms of the deal by providing it with gradual sanctions relief tied to the implementation of its nuclear obligations under the deal. It is also desirable for there to be international support for any efforts Iran makes to implement of best practices for nuclear energy programs. Further, negotiators should elaborate all the provisions of the future agreement in the most precise manner so as to minimize the potential for conflicting interpretations.

4) The participants also discussed in depth the DPRK nuclear issue. They expressed their deep concern about the deadlock of the Six-Party talks on the DPRK nuclear weapons and the expansion of its nuclear weapons and missile programs against the background of periodic escalation of political tensions and nuclear threats on the Korean peninsula. The failure to achieve a diplomatic settlement of the DPRK nuclear problem is undercutting regional stability in Northeast Asia and harms the global nuclear proliferation regime.

The participants of the conference recommend that P5 initiate consultations on this crucial issue in order to establish a joint position taking into account the security interests of all relevant states; efforts should be made to reassure South Korea and Japan in order to avoid pressures for further proliferation in the region. The ultimate strategic goal of diplomacy with the DPRK remains denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and the DPRK’s return to the NPT and restoration of the IAEA safeguards. In the present unfavorable diplomatic environment, it seems sensible to pursue a package of intermediate measures aimed at stabilizing the situation and constraining the DPRK’s nuclear capability. Such measures could include:

· minimize the risk of use of nuclear weapons;

· refrain from any provocative military actions;

· stop further nuclear tests;

· stop further missile tests/development;

· stop production of weapons-usable nuclear materials and nuclear explosive devices;

· prevent proliferation of nuclear and missile materials and technology.

In order to encourage North Korean cooperation with the above steps and its engagement in building a regional North East-Asian security regime, a number of measures should be considered: provision of humanitarian assistance and economic aid, easing of sanctions and security assurances.

If these efforts fail, the UNSC should consider all other options.

These and other important nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament issues will continue to be discussed at future meetings of the Luxembourg Forum.

Members of the Conference of the International Luxembourg Forum on Preventing Nuclear Catastrophe