INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON PREVENTING NUCLEAR
CATASTROPHE
DECLARATION
On May 24-25, 2007, fifty
seven independent experts in global security, arms control and disarmament from
fourteen countries met at an international conference in Luxembourg to
discuss the prevention of a nuclear catastrophe and ways of strengthening the
nuclear non-proliferation regime.
Participants of the Luxembourg Conference concluded that the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the related nuclear non-proliferation
and disarmament regimes are facing unprecedented challenges and need high-level
political support to sustain and strengthen them.
First, the greatest direct threat for the foreseeable future stems from the
possibility that terrorist organizations will gain access to nuclear explosive
devices or nuclear materials. Second, there is a danger that the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the whole non-proliferation regime
will collapse because of a failure to resolve on-going nuclear crises such as
those in Iran and North Korea. Third, most acute factor is the problem of poor
compliance with, and weak enforcement, of non-proliferation obligations. This
includes the lack of commitment by nuclear weapon states to nuclear
disarmament, their continuing reliance on nuclear deterrence, and the disintegration
of the nuclear arms control and disarmament process.
Conference participants emphasized that such developments will undercut not
only regional, but also global security, and raise the danger of terrorist use
of nuclear explosive devices or combat employment of nuclear weapons. The
international community must address this situation with the utmost urgency.
Participants noted that the promotion of peace, respect of each other's
legitimate interests, and good neighborly relations among states are fundamental
to international security and necessary as a pre-condition for the advancement
of the non-proliferation regime, nuclear arms control and disarmament
agreements.
Experts attending the Conference propose to the United Nations Secretary
General, the Member States of the United Nations, the Group of Eight, the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the European Union, the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Commonwealth of Independent States, the
Collective Security Treaty Organization, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization
and other authoritative international organizations a roadmap embracing the
following initiatives:
1. Reaffirmation of nuclear-weapon states' commitment to the goal of nuclear
disarmament in accordance with Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty;
reduction of their reliance on nuclear deterrence; convening a special summit
of nuclear-weapon states on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation and a
special session of the United Nations General Assembly on disarmament; urgent
renewal of the dialogue between the United States of America and the Russian
Federation on further nuclear arms reductions and limitations; enhancement of
cooperation on the development of missile defense systems as provided for by
the Joint Declaration on New Strategic Relationship of 2002; initiation of
consultations with the United Kingdom, France and China on their participation,
in a format acceptable to them, in nuclear forces limitations, as well as in
transparency and confidence-building measures existing between the United
States of America and the Russian Federation; adoption by all nuclear-weapon
states parties to the NPT, of an unconditional obligation on the non-first use
of nuclear weapons against any state party to this Treaty; initiation of
international negotiations on the Code of Conduct on peaceful space activities
and on space security problems.
2. Signing and ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty by all
states, and in particular by the Annex II (44) states that have not yet done
so, to bring about the early entry into force thereof.
3. Acknowledging certain progress achieved so far, all the parties in the
six-party talks should take effective measures to implement the Joint Document
regarding the Democratic Peoples' Republic
of Korea's nuclear
program. The Democratic Peoples' Republic
of Korea should terminate
its nuclear weapons program, return to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and
International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards and abide by the international
disarmament treaties and export control mechanisms related to weapons of mass
destruction and delivery systems. In return, the international community, and
the other five parties of the six-party talks in particular, should provide
adequate security assurances, energy and humanitarian assistance and help in
the development of energy industry.
4. Closer coordination of the positions of the six countries negotiating with Iran on the implementation of International
Atomic Energy Agency safeguards in Iran. Iranian defiance of the
United Nations resolutions is unacceptable. Iran must comply with United
Nations Security Council resolutions and the International Atomic Energy Agency
Board of Governors' resolutions, by resolving all outstanding issues with the
Agency. Foremost, Iran must
fulfill the United Nations Security Council's demand that Iran should
without further delay suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing
activities, including research and development, to be verified by the IAEA, as
well as work on all heavy-water related projects, including the construction of
a research reactor moderated by heavy water, also to be verified by the IAEA.
Failure to comply with these provisions will lead to strengthening sanctions
against Iran,
as specified in Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, using all
appropriate means within the authority of the United Nations Security Council.
Iranian compliance with the United Nations Security Council resolutions and
removal of all non-compliance issues would make possible provision of a package
of incentives, including assured delivery of low-enriched uranium or nuclear
fuel and removal of irradiated fuel for reprocessing and storage abroad. Other
incentives may include international help with developing the Iranian oil and
gas industries, admittance to the World Trade Organization and, eventually,
resumption of diplomatic relations with the United States of America. Iranian
political circles and population at large should be informed of the
considerable economic and social-political advantages pursuant to Iranian
compliance with the United Nations Security Council resolutions, and the
International Atomic Energy Agency Board of Governors' resolutions.
5. Encouraging India, Israel and Pakistan and providing to them incentives to
come closer, where appropriate, to the nuclear non-proliferation regime through
concluding the International Atomic Energy Agency 1997 Additional Protocol,
signing and ratifying in full the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty,
joining negotiations on the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty and international
export control mechanisms, as well as undertaking confidence- and
security-building measures, regarding nuclear weapons. It should be taken into
consideration that Israel
has already signed the CTBT. Such steps will be conducive to the broader
involvement of these three countries in international peaceful nuclear
cooperation programs, and other regional and global endeavors in the economic
or security realm.
6. In view of the growing threat of nuclear terrorism much more intensive and
broad preventive measures are urgently needed to enhance physical protection,
accounting and control of fissile materials worldwide, and to accelerate
disposition of highly-enriched uranium by its conversion to low-enriched
uranium and application to peaceful purposes, capitalizing on the positive
experience of the agreement on highly-enriched uranium and low-enriched uranium
between the United States of America and the Russian Federation ("HEU-LEU
deal"). Additional, and if necessary international cooperative measures to
protect nuclear power plants, research reactors and nuclear weapons storage
sites should be undertaken.
7. Further enhancement of the International Atomic Energy Agency comprehensive
safeguards, foremost by signing and ratifying the 1997 Additional Protocol to
the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards agreements by all states that
have not yet done so; and for the 31 states - parties to the NPT, that have not
yet concluded safeguards agreements, to do so as soon as possible.
Strengthening barriers against withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation Treaty by
strictly regulating the withdrawal procedure, inter alia by introducing a
requirement for well-founded motivation for the withdrawal, and ensuring
compliance with withdrawal notice period pursuant to Article X, as well as by
adopting regulations on maintaining International Atomic Energy Agency
safeguards over any technologies and materials obtained under the
Non-Proliferation Treaty. In case of withdrawal, dual-purpose technologies and
materials should be returned to suppliers under the Agency's supervision which
should be ensured by agreeing on corresponding regulations with the Nuclear
Suppliers Group and Zangger Committee.
8. Enhancing the role of the UN Security Council in strengthening the nuclear
non-proliferation regime. Making all necessary efforts to consolidate positions
of the UN Security Council permanent member-states in enforcing the NPT
obligations. Improving the efficiency and ensuring compliance with
international law of counter-proliferation measures regarding nuclear and other
weapons of mass destruction (pursuant, for example, the Proliferation Security
Initiative, United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1540 and 1673, and the
Convention on Nuclear Terrorism).
9. Coordinating international efforts to limit the spread of nuclear fuel cycle
technologies to additional states, while developing a reliable mechanism for
fuel supply assurances and solutions for spent fuel management and removal.
Appointing a high level United Nations commission to consider various existing
proposals on multilateral nuclear fuel cycle supplies and services, in
particular capitalizing on the practical experience of the Russian Federation
and other states in advancing such projects. Encouraging the Global Nuclear
Energy Partnership as a program to provide for the energy needs of emerging
economies, while elevating non-proliferation standards to an equal level with
environmental safety requirements.
10. Starting consultations on elevating the Missile Technology Control Regime
and the International Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation,
as well as the system of control over the exports of nuclear materials and
technologies within the Nuclear Suppliers Group, to the status of international
conventions.
Luxembourg
conference participants consider the implementation of the above-mentioned
measures by all concerned states and international organizations as a way to
make a breakthrough in preventing further proliferation of nuclear weapons and
in precluding their accessibility to terrorists, as well as building global and
regional security.
Participants express their intent to establish a permanent Luxembourg Forum
with the purpose of holding policy-oriented conferences and meetings of experts
and issuing policy-relevant publications on nuclear non-proliferation and
disarmament on a regular basis.
1. Uzi ARAD
Director of the Institute for Policy and Strategy at the Lauder School of
Government, Diplomacy and Strategy, Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya; Adviser
to the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee; Professor (Israel).
2. Alexei ARBATOV
Head of the Center for International Security of the Institute for World
Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), Russian Academy of Sciences;
Scholar-in-Residence of the Carnegie Moscow Center; Corresponding member of the
Russian Academy of Sciences (former Deputy Chairman of the Defense Committee of
the State Duma, Federal Assembly - Russian Parliament).
3. Vladimir BARANOVSKIY
Deputy Director of the IMEMO, Russian Academy of Sciences; Corresponding member of the Russian Academy of Sciences.
4. Francesco CALOGERO
Professor of Theoretical Physics of the Department of Physics, University of
Rome "La Sapienza"
(former Secretary General of Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs,
Italy).
5. Shahran CHUBIN
Director of Studies and Joint Course Director, International Training Course in
Security Policy, Geneva Centre for Security
Policy; Ph.D. (Switzerland).
6. Joseph CIRINCIONE
Senior Vice President of the National Security and International Affairs at the
Center for American Progress (USA).
7. Armand CLESSE
Director of the Luxembourg Institute for European and International Studies;
Ph.D. (Luxembourg).
8. Thomas COCHRAN
Director of the Nuclear Program, Natural Resources Defense Council; Ph.D. (USA).
9. Jayantha DHANAPALA
Senior Adviser to the President of Sri Lanka (former United Nations
Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs); Ambassador (Sri Lanka).
10. Anatoliy DIAKOV
Director of the Center for Arms Control, Energy and Environmental Studies of
the Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology; Ph.D. (Russia).
11. Vladimir DVORKIN
Principal researcher of the IMEMO, Russian Academy of Sciences; Major-General,
ret.; Professor; full member of the Russian Academy of Rocket and Artillery
Sciences, Academies of Military Sciences, the Russian Engineering Academy, the
International Engineering Academy, Russian Academy of Astronautics (former
Director of the 4th Major Institute of the Ministry of Defense, Russia).
12. Andrey FEDOROV
Member of Presidium, Council on Foreign and Defense Policy (former Deputy
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Russia).
13. Trevor FINDLAY
Director of the Canadian Center for Treaty Compliance; Associate Professor of
the Norman Paterson
School of International Affairs (Canada).
14. Mark FITZPATRICK
Senior Fellow for Non-Proliferation of the International Institute for
Strategic Studies (UK).
15. Henry GAFFNEY
Director for Strategy and Concepts of the Center for Naval Analyses, CNA
Corporation (USA).
16. Rose GOTTEMOELLER
Director of the Carnegie
Moscow Center
(former Assistant Secretary for Non-Proliferation and National Security of the
U.S. Department of Energy).
17. Arnold
HORELICK
Professor Emeritus of Political Science of the University
of California at Los
Angeles (USA).
18. Carlo JEAN
President of the Society for the Management of Nuclear Plants «SOGIN» (former
Military Adviser to the President of Italy); General ret. (Italy).
19. Alexander KALIADIN
Principal Researcher of the IMEMO, Russian
Academy of Sciences; Ph.D. (Russia).
20. Viatcheslav KANTOR
President of the European Jewish Congress; President of the Russian Jewish Congress,
Ph.D. (Russia).
21. Sergey KARAGANOV
Chairman of Presidium of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy; Deputy
Director of the Institute of Europe, Russian
Academy of Sciences; Professor (Russia).
22. Catherine
KELLEHER
College Park Professor at the University of Maryland;
Senior Fellow of the Center for Naval Analysis, CNA Corporation (USA).
23. Isaak KHALATNIKOV
Director Emeritus of the Landau Institute for Theoretical Physics, Russian Academy
of Sciences; Academician (Russia).
24. Anton KHLOPKOV
Executive Director of the PIR Center (Russia).
25. Byungki KIM
Vice Dean and Professor of International Relations at the Graduate
School of International Studies, Korea University
(Republic of Korea).
26. Alexander KONOVALOV
President of the Institute for Strategic Assessments; Professor of the Moscow
State Institute for International Relations (MGIMO, Russia).
27. Michael KREPON
Founding President of the Henry L. Stimson Center (USA).
28. Robert LEGVOLD
Professor of the Columbia University (USA).
29. Alexander NIKITIN
Director of the Center for Euro-Atlantic Security, MGIMO; President of the
Russian Political Science Association; Professor (Russia).
30. Robert NURICK
Senior Fellow of the Center for Non-Proliferation Studies, Monterey Institute
of International Studies (USA).
31. Vladimir ORLOV
President of the PIR Center; Co-Director of the European Training Course
in Security Policy at the Geneva Centre for
Security Policy; Ph.D. (Russia).
32. Sergey OZNOBISHCHEV
Director of the Institute for Strategic Assessments; Professor of the MGIMO and
the Higher School of Economics, full member of the Russian Academy of
Cosmonautics, the World Academy of Sciences for Complex Security (former Chief
of the Organizational Analytic Division, Russian Academy of Sciences).
33. Zhenqiang PAN
Vice-President of the China
Foundation for International Studies and Academic Changes; Professor of
International Relations at the Institute for Strategic Studies, University of National
Security; Major-General ret. (China).
34. George PERKOVICH
Vice President for Studies-Global Security and Economic Development and
Director of the Non-Proliferation Program at the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace; Ph.D. (USA).
35. Alexander PIKAEV
Vice-chairman of the Committee of Academics for International Security; Head of
the Department, IMEMO; Ph.D. (Russia).
36. William
POTTER
Director James
Martin Center
for Non-Proliferation Studies and Professor of Non-Proliferation Studies,
Monterey Institute of International Studies; Ph.D. (USA).
37. Vasantha RAO RAGHAVAN
Director of the Delhi Policy Group; President of the Centre for Security
Analysis; Lieutenant General, ret. (India).
38. Roald SAGDEEV
Distinguished Professor of Physics and Director of the "East-West"
Center, University of Maryland; Director Emeritus of the Russian Space
Research Institute, Russian
Academy of Sciences;
Academician (Russia/USA).
39. Evgeniy SATANOVSKIY
President of the Institute of the Middle East; Ph.D. (Russia).
40. Vladimir SAZHIN
Senior Associate of the Institute for Oriental Studies (RAS); Professor (Russia).
41. Carlo SCHAERF
Professor of Physics of the University of Rome
"Tor Vergata" (former President of the National Commission for Nuclear Physics, Italy).
42. John STEINBRUNER
Professor of the School of Public Policy; Director of the Center for
International and Security Studies at the University of Maryland.
43. Roland TIMERBAYEV
Chairman of the Board of the PIR-Center (former Permanent USSR/Russia's
Representative to International Organizations in Vienna);
Ambassador (Russia).
44. Jon WOLFSTHAL
Senior Fellow (International Security Program) of the Center for Strategic and
International Studies (USA).
*) Having endorsed the principal ideas and the general thrust of this Declaration some participants of the Luxembourg Conference have reserved their objections with respect to some of its particular recommendations. Personally these experts are: Thomas Cochran, George Perkovich, Vasantha Raghavan, Roland Timerbaev.