Презентация совместной книги Международного Люксембургского форума и фонда «Инициатива по снижению ядерной угрозы» (“NTI”, США) «Предотвращение кризиса в контроле над ядерными вооружениями и катастрофический терроризм»

Владимир Дворкин.Дорогие коллеги и уважаемые участники средств массовой информации!

Interpreter.Dear colleagues and respected representatives of mass media!

Владимир Дворкин.Я Владимир Дворкин, председатель организационного комитета Люксембургского форума.

Interpreter.My name is Vladimir Dvorkin, I’m the Chairman of the Luxembourg Forum.

Владимир Дворкин.И мне поручено открыть презентацию нашей книжки.

Interpreter.I’ve been asked to open the presentation of our book.

Владимир Дворкин.Название книжки вам известно, вы ее видели. И эта книга подготовлена по результатам совместной конференции.

Interpreter.You know the name, the title of the book, you’ve seen it, and it’s been prepared following the results of a joint conference.

Владимир Дворкин.Люксембургского форума и Фонда «Инициатива по уменьшению ядерной угрозы».

Interpreter.Of the Luxembourg Forum and NTI, the Common Threat Reduction Initiative.

Владимир Дворкин.Конференция прошла в декабре 2015 года.

Interpreter.The conference took place in December of 2015.

Владимир Дворкин.На ней было согласовано совместное заявление двух организаций с предложениями по необходимым первоочередным шагам.

Interpreter.The two organizations came up with an approved statement on their behalf that expressed the next steps, priority, high-priority steps to be taken.

Владимир Дворкин.Это заявление было незамедлительно представлено президентам России и Соединенных Штатов.

Interpreter.That statement was passed on immediately to the presidents of Russia and the United States.

Владимир Дворкин.И уже в январе 2016 года последовала реакция на это заявление.

Interpreter.And there was a response to that statement as early as January of 2016.

Владимир Дворкин.Если кому-нибудь придет в голову мысль, что это теперь уже не актуально, то пусть он бросит в меня камень. Или микрофон, что легче.

Interpreter.If anyone happens to think that that subject has lost its validity today, let him throw a stone at me, or perhaps a microphone.

Владимир Дворкин.Но не надо сразу бросать, а сначала посмотрите эту книжку и послушайте, что вам скажут авторы заявления и книги.

Interpreter.But please don’t go about tossing that mike at me right away; first, take a look at the book, and perhaps you’ll learn from what the authors of the book have to tell you and explain.

Владимир Дворкин.Авторы книжки: Сэм Нанн, Вячеслав Кантор, Алексей Арбатов, Линтон Брукс, Сергей Ознобищев, Анатолий Дьяков, Эндрю Вебер, Мартимер(?), а также я.

Interpreter.Among the authors of the book are: Senator Nunn, Mr. Kantor, myself, Mr. Oznobishchev… And the other names you’ve just heard.

Владимир Дворкин.Я не буду представлять всех авторов и участников конференции, авторов и книжки, и заявления. Вы их хорошо знаете, это известные в мире люди.

Interpreter.I do not intend to introduce all the authors of the book and the statement that was issued at that time; you all know them very well, these people are very well known and famous around the world.

Владимир Дворкин.Книжка содержит доклады и статьи практически по основным вопросам в нашей сфере деятельности.

Interpreter.The book contains reports and articles that cover all the main issues, burning issues in our area of expertise and knowledge.

Владимир Дворкин.По проблемам глобальных и региональных угроз; контроль ядерных вооружений; предотвращение ядерного и биологического терроризма; по кибербезопасности; по укреплению режима ядерного нераспространения.

Interpreter.The book contains the most important issues, and that’s the nuclear arms control, the prevention of terrorism, both conventional and biological, various cyber issues and issues of non-proliferation.

Владимир Дворкин.Конечно, после выборов в Соединенных Штатах по позиции новой администрации и программам действий обстановка остается весьма неопределенной.

Interpreter.No doubt, after the most recent election in the United States and the new administration coming in, we have to acknowledge that the general tone, the general situation remains uncertain.

Владимир Дворкин.Я не могу прогнозировать ее развитие; может быть, это могут сделать более опытные политологи, присутствующие здесь.

Interpreter.I will not undertake to try to forecast further developments, and perhaps some of the political analysts present here will assume that responsibility.

Владимир Дворкин.Однако надо иметь в виду, что в любом случае основные выводы и предложения обращения и содержание книги сделаны на основе богатейшего опыта и представления принципов стратегической стабильности.

Interpreter.But it has to be borne in mind that the most of the proposals and remarks offered in that book and the contents of the book have been made on the basis of the wealth of experience and extensive knowledge in the area of strategic stability.

Владимир Дворкин.И только соблюдая и развивая эти принципы можно обеспечить приемлемый уровень международной безопасности.

Interpreter.There’s only one way to maintain an acceptable level of international security, and that way is to develop and expand those principles expressed.

Владимир Дворкин.Я предлагаю сейчас сделать краткие заявления некоторым участникам конференции, авторам книги и заявления, после чего представители информационных средств могут задать вопросы. На которые, может быть, даже получат ответы.

Interpreter.I’m going to suggest that the authors of the book come up with short explanations, presentations or remarks; after that, I’m going to give an opportunity to mass media to ask questions and perhaps, hopefully, get some answers.

ВладимирДворкин.Des, you… First speaker.

Browne. OK. So, thank you, Sergey, colleagues. Ladies and gentleman, I am Des Browne, I am also a member of the House of Lords in the United Kingdom, and formally was the Secretary of State for Defense in the United Kingdom. I am the vice chair of NTI and involved in other organizations who work in this general space of Euro-Atlantic security.

My first task is to offer the apologies of the chair and chief executive of NTI, Senator Sam Nunn, who participated in this forum conference, Luxembourg Forum conference, and is delighted to see the publication of this book of the papers that were presented for our discussions; unfortunately, owing to family commitments, he cannot be with us today, but he sends his support, along with his apologies that he cannot be with you, and his continued commitment to the agenda that we are going to be discussing.

I do not intend to deal with any of the individual papers in this book; the authors of those papers are in the room, and they should have responsibility for their own words and the credit for the arguments and proposals that they have put forward, but I do want to just say, with the permission of everybody present, a few words about why I am so proud to be involved with the Luxembourg Forum and my colleagues here and friends who are involved in this initiative and agenda.

As General Dvorkin made clear in his opening remarks, everyone is aware of the deterioration of relations between the Russian Federation and the West generally. That chasm of lack of confidence and trust appears to have widened, and to be probably wider now, in some people’s estimation, than at any time during much of the Cold War. This is a very dangerous set of circumstances, but despite these differences there continue to be areas of existential common interests that have to be addressed, because the circumstances that this book addresses continue to exist, and they continue to exist in an unstable environment, where there are no longer the certainties that there were before.

So, I mean, as we did during the darkest days of the Cold War, we must work together to avoid catastrophic consequences, including preventing terrorist attacks with the use of these materials, or by reducing the risks of military or even nuclear conflict in the space that we all occupy.

Since their respective inceptions, the Nuclear Threat Initiative and the International Luxembourg Forum have been involved in Euro-Atlantic security, some of us individually inside government, but certainly all of us outside government collectively recognizing the importance of dialogue and the importance of sharing our concerns and thinking and coming to recommendations that can be jointly supported and presented to our respective governments.

So, the statement of the conference which General Dvorkin referred to was presented to the White House, and we know that attention was paid to it, but, as the General has pointed out, since then has been a very important election here in the United States, and there is an uncertainty about what the approach of the current administration will be to the issues that most concern us about the security of this space.

I just say this: that with the uncertainty comes opportunity. We were told this week by a representative of the administration that old nuclear policy is under review, and that it will be under review for some time, and in the context of that review we certainly at the Nuclear Threat Initiative, you know, intend to present, among others, some of the recommendations of this conference to those involved in the review, so that there may be inner considerations.

I think our collective experience says that the lack of trust and confidence is such at this time that we must find areas, advance our common interests, identify and pursue concrete and practical near-term initiatives which are designed to reduce immediate risks, and that the involvement in them bilaterally will not reduce anybody’s own perception of the security, and thereby rebuild trust and improve the Euro-Atlantic security landscape at the same time.

So, I just want to share with you, and some of these recommendations are reflections of papers that were presented to us in the areas where we found common cause, a few near-term practical steps that we think are both urgent and necessary; I will not go into them in detail, but just refer to them.

So, we must reduce the danger of a nuclear weapon being used, in any circumstances, even if it is accidentally. And there are many experts who are assessing that that risk is increasing rather than reducing in the current environment. So, even an accidental launch, the risk of the use of these weapons is unnecessarily high, in our view, and we recommend that leaders revisit a joint position that a nuclear war cannot be won and must therefore never be fought. We think that that joint expression of a position that instructed the approach for much of the Cold War to arms control and considerations would be a very good starting point. It would do no harm if our respective leaders across the Euro-Atlantic space signed up to that commitment.

We believe we must reduce the risk of nuclear weapons on prompt launch. There are too many weapons in significant numbers in the space that we live in which are minutes from launch. And we do not believe that that posture is necessary for the current status; and that it should be backed off from. And we must reduce the threat of radiological materials which are dispersed for many purposes across our space, and in many cases not that well secured; we must significantly reduce the threat of these falling into the wrong hands. We know that the Islamic State, whatever you call it, ISIS or ISIL, is aware of the danger of this material to us, and they have expressed publicly their interest in getting their hands on it, and suggested even, when they took over Mosul, that they had taken the material out of the hospital. So, whether they did or not, I don’t know, and I have not seen evidence, but certainly they know the terror effect of this material.

We must work on reducing military confrontation in the space that we are jointly exercising and operating in, in the borders between NATO and the Russian Federation, and we must reduce the risk of a mid-air incident, which is increased significantly by the increased number of flights by military aircraft which do not have the transponders on.

So, we propose these simple steps which do not undermine anyone’s individual security on any perception of the security as a way forward, but we collectively believe that returning to an environment in which arms control was a significant part of our collective security is the space that we must seek out again. So, I thank all of those who were involved with us in the conference, and maintain this constant agenda of dialog and discussion about some of the most difficult things in the world, and I commend the Luxembourg Forum, which I’ve been involved with for some time now, for the work that it does. Thank you.

Владимир Дворкин.Thank you, Des. Я должен сказать, что, ранее министр обороны, лорд Дес Браун – член наблюдательного совета Люксембургского форума, и он весьма активен на всех наших заседаниях, в нашей деятельности, вносит большой вклад в формирование нашей позиции, Люксембургского форума. Спасибо, Дес.

Interpreter.Let me just add, Des Browne used to be a defense minister, minister of defense, and he’s also a member of the supervisory council, he’s always been very active working with us, has made a vast contribution. Thank you very much, Des.

Browne.Thank you.

Владимир Дворкин.Слово сенатору Владимиру Лукину, ранее послу России в Соединенных Штатах, и у него еще очень много других постов. Пожалуйста!

Interpreter.I’m going to turn it over to Mr. Lukin, formerly the Ambassador of the Russian Federation in the United States; he’s got many more positions and ranks that I’m not going to enumerate here. Please, go ahead.

Лукин.Я очень рад присутствовать здесь, на этом важном событии.

Interpreter.I’m really glad to be able to attend this very important event.

Лукин.И не только потому, что здесь я вижу много старых друзей иных времен, но и потому, что тема, о которой идет речь, одна из стержневых, центральных тем мировой политики, причем тема не конъюнктурная, а именно тема принципиально важная и долговременная.

Interpreter.I am glad not just because I see old faces here, from former times, but also because the subject matter of this conference includes the core issues of world politics, not because just a trite subject matter that’s going to go away very quickly, but because it’s something that really underlies world politics and will do so for many years to come.

Лукин.Я предпочитаю говорить по-русски не только потому, что это язык, который я знаю лучше всех остальных, но и потому, что в Вашингтоне последнее время он звучит реже, о чем я лично очень сожалею.

Interpreter.I would prefer to speak Russian now, not only because I know Russian better than English, I think, but also for the reason that more recently the Russian language has not been frequently used in Washington, D.C., which I’m very sorry about.

Лукин.Я был долгое время, довольно долгое время активным участником процесса NTI и очень горд тем, что работал с такими выдающимися людьми, как сенаторы Нанн и Лугар, как Уильям Перри и многие, многие другие.

Interpreter.For quite a while I’ve been an active participant in the NTI process, and I’m very proud of being able to do so and to work together with such outstanding personalities as Senator Nunn, Lugar, Mr. William Perry and many-many others.

Лукин.Но, поскольку хорошие друзья, хорошие предприятия, подобно древним животным, размножаются делением, то вот Люксембургский был форум – стал еще одним важным делом в этом процессе ограничения стратегических вооружений.

Interpreter.And just remembering that the ancient organisms, the way that they spread around and propagate is by dividing themselves, this is exactly what’s been happening to the Luxembourg Forum, it has been expanding and encompassing more and more structures.

Лукин.И я очень рад, что принимаю посильное участие в этой важной международной акции.

Interpreter.And I’m really glad that I’m being able to contribute as much as I can to this important event.

Лукин.Но я думаю, что политическая конъюнктура меняется, и была – в свое время разоруженческие процессы стояли в центре наших двусторонних отношений.

Interpreter.Everybody understands that the political agenda keeps changing and fluctuating; there was a time once when disarmament was the center stage of our relationships.

Лукин.Затем начался целый период, когда была преобладающей точка зрения, что эти процессы как бы отошли на второй план и были заслонены другими аспектами злобы дня.

Interpreter.And then there was a time, there was a period of time with the predominant view that those issues should be in the background of our discussions, and other important issues took their place.

Лукин.Но как бы ни было, как бы ни менялось восприятие тех процессов, сама-то ситуация MAD, Mutual Assured Destruction, она остается неизменной.

Interpreter.And no matter how much perception changes, the essence, the check and mate of this thing, the Mutual Assured Destruction, continues to be center stage.

Лукин.И если не концентрировать внимание на каких-то усилиях по прогрессу в этом деле, прогрессу в создании препятствий на пути дальнейшему бесконтрольному вооружению, и количественному, и качественному, то мы, конечно, придем к ужасному концу.

Interpreter.And of course, if we fail to focus on some progress resolving these issues, and fail to install impediments in the way of this uncontrollable, what seems to be uncontrollable process, both quantitatively and qualitatively, we’re going to end up in a terrible, in a horrible situation.

Лукин.Международные соглашения в этой области либо устаревают и не возобновляются, либо явно не заключаются, хотя они необходимы, на новой основе, в новых условиях.

Interpreter.International agreements and treaties in this area become either outdated or don’t get resumed; but anyway, they don’t get discussed and signed, perhaps on a new foundation or basis.

Лукин.Ядерное распространение, несмотря на отдельные локальные успехи, все же движется в целом в неблагоприятном направлении.

Interpreter.Nuclear proliferation, in spite of some random successes, has been moving in a generally unfavorable direction.

Лукин.Самое главное, пожалуй, что очень волнует, это то, что накопленный потенциал доверия в этой области между двумя странами, который распространялся и на другие сферы их отношений, даже в условиях холодной войны, – этот потенциал уменьшается и стремится к нулю.

Interpreter.What really concerns us a lot is that the trust potential that had been accumulated and was spilling over to other aspects of life and relationships, despite the Cold War around, has now got a tendency to move towards becoming a zero.

Лукин.Поэтому книга, которую мы сейчас берем в руки, рассматриваем с большим вниманием, книга, написанная выдающимися авторами, очень своевременно обращает наше внимание на эту самую важную и нерешенную проблему.

Interpreter.That’s why the book that you’re just going to pick up and read, written by outstanding people and personalities, is very timely and really calls our attention to this unresolved, but extremely significant issue.

Лукин.Поэтому разрешите мне от души поздравить всех авторов этой книги. Они делают очень важное дело.

Interpreter.Let me congratulate all the authors and the people involved in this book from the bottom of my heart; I think they’ve done a very important job.

Лукин.И пожелать им и всем нам увидеть серьезные и конкретные результаты их усилий в возможно более близком будущем.

Interpreter.I wish they and all of us will be able to see very specific, very tangible results of the fruit of their labor in the not-so-distant future.

Лукин.От этого зависит будущее нас, наших детей, а с учетом среднего возраста присутствующих за этим столом – и наших внуков.

Interpreter.And of course that’s what the future, our future, the future of our children and also, given the average age of the people sitting in this room, our grandchildren – all of that depends on the results of that effort.

Лукин.Спасибо.

Interpreter.Thank you so much.

Владимир Дворкин.Thank you, Владимир Петрович. Я хотел бы попросить сейчас выступить президента и директора Фонда «Инициатива по уменьшению ядерной угрозы» Джоан Ролфинг(?).

Interpreter.I’m going to turn the floor to the director of NTI now.

Rohlfing.Thank you very much. On behalf of the Nuclear Threat Initiative, I want to thank the Luxembourg Forum for your partnership on this important project; my thanks also to the authors who contributed to this important book. I’m going to echo themes of the previous speakers on this panel; although we did not coordinate our points, I find it interesting that we’re hearing the same themes emerge from one speaker to the next, to the next. And that is the need to overcome the lack of trust that has developed between our two nations, and a path forward to surmount this growing nuclear competition that is making the world a much more dangerous place.

We assemble here at a very precarious time; as mentioned, we have this growing political tension between the two biggest nuclear powers in the world, and there is a dangerous absence of dialog on a threat that is existential for us. Alexey Arbatov reminded me within the last day that we’re entering a period where we’ve now gone six years without any dialog, any negotiation between our two countries on the nuclear threat. This is the longest period of time since we began negotiations in 1969 on the SALT Treaty. And it’s a very dangerous position to be in, because at the same time we have this growing distrust, there’s been an erosion of the existing arms control instruments that have stabilized the threat, provided a system of constraints over nearly a 50-year period now. So we stand at the precipice of the potential disintegration of the arms control regimes that have served us over a multi-decadal period, and potentially we find ourselves entering a period where we have no limits, no constraints on our nuclear weapons.

So it’s important to raise awareness about these threats, and that’s one of the reasons this book is so important. We need to work to rebuild the atmosphere that enables us to improve political relations between our two countries, and I found it interesting that our previous speakers have all mentioned the need to find near-term practical steps, the wish for tangible results to help us reach a better place.

My hope is that through this work and through some of the innovative ideas contained in this book that we’ll be able to resume dialog, and arms control negotiations in particular, to ensure that the stabilizing constraints that we carefully developed and built and have observed over now many decades will stay in place.

So, I’m encouraged by the fact that we can gather here together as partners, Americans and Russians, in the spirit of cooperation, with the desire to find a path forward, and that gives me hope that our governments will do the same thing. Thank you very much.

Владимир Дворкин.Thank you, Joan. Я попрошу сейчас сказать несколько слов одному из основных авторов книжки, академику Алексею Арбатову. Пожалуйста.

Interpreter.I’m going to turn it over to one of the principal authors of the book, academician Arbatov. Please!

Арбатов.Спасибо. С того момента, когда мы обсуждали вопросы на совместной конференции Люксембургского форума и NTI, прошел год и несколько месяцев, почти полтора года.

Interpreter.There’s been almost a year and a few months, let’s say a year and a half, since the time we had the joint conference between the Luxembourg Forum and NTI.

Арбатов.Но, к сожалению, эта книга остается не менее, а еще более актуальной.

Interpreter.Regretfully, the issues taken up, they have not diminished, but on the contrary, they’ve become even more significant.

Арбатов.Я говорю «к сожалению», потому что за это время не было сделано ни единого шага в направлении поддержания режима контроля над ядерным оружием и режима нераспространения ядерного оружия.

Interpreter.And I’m using the word “regretfully” because not a single step has been taken over this period of time to make any improvements in the arms control regime and in non-proliferation regime.

Арбатов.Этот режим и процесс похож на велосипед: на нем нельзя стоять на месте. Или можно двигаться вперед, пусть не быстрыми темпами, но все-таки двигаться, или вы неизбежно упадете. И так же процесс: или должен продолжаться, или он начинает распадаться, что мы сейчас и видим.

Interpreter.Those regimes run like a well-oiled bicycle: it cannot be at a standstill. If you stop moving the pedals, you’re going to end up falling off, and that’s exactly what’s happening to those regimes, and that’s what we are witnessing today.

Арбатов.Наибольшая угроза нависла над договором о ракетах средней и меньшей дальности, INF Treaty.

Interpreter.The worst kind of danger looms over the INF Treaty, the medium and small range missiles.

Арбатов.Этот договор уникален в том, что он явился основой процесса быстрого сокращения ядерного оружия, который начался именно с этого договора тридцать лет назад.

Interpreter.And that’s a unique treaty in many respects, as it served as the basis for rapid reduction of nuclear weapons, the process that started about thirty years ago.

Арбатов.Благодаря этому договору последовали другие важные соглашения, и в результате за прошедшие тридцать лет у нас сейчас в мире ядерного оружия почти в десять раз меньше, чем было тогда.

Interpreter.Other important treaties and agreements followed suit, and over the thirty years that have passed we ended up in a situation when the number of nuclear weapons is tenfold less today than what we used to have at that time.

Арбатов.Но последние шесть лет процесс остановился, и режим начал распадаться.

Interpreter.However, in the very last six years that process has come to a standstill, and the regime has started to fall apart.

Арбатов.До президентских выборов в США активную роль играла администрация Обамы, предлагая России сделать новые шаги в этой области, но Россия от этого отказывалась.

Interpreter.Before the new administration the Obama administration had been making suggestions aimed at Russia, in terms of taking new steps in this area, but Russia refused to follow suit.

Арбатов.Россия использовала некоторые аргументы; одни можно признать справедливыми, другие были просто отговорками, но во всяком случае Россия не реагировала на эти предложения.

Interpreter.In response, Russia came up with some objections, some of them could be considered sound enough, others were merely excuses, but, in a word, Russia turned down those offers.

Арбатов.Сейчас сменилась администрация в США.

Interpreter.There’s a new administration in the United States now.

Арбатов.Нет никакой уверенности, что она будет активно продолжать линию предыдущей администрации. Скорее наоборот.

Interpreter.And there’s no certainty that it will continue with the political line that the former administration had been pursuing; more likely, the opposite will happen.

Арбатов.Если в этих условиях Россия не изменит свою позицию, которую я называю оборонительно-негативной, то через несколько лет ничего не останется от всего режима контроля над ядерным оружием.

Interpreter.If Russia doesn’t alter in some ways its position, current position, and I call that position “defensively negative”, in a few years what we’re going to end up with is just mere nothing left of the nuclear arms control regime.

Арбатов.Поэтому книга, к сожалению, остается актуальной; ситуация сейчас хуже, чем была полтора года назад. Но будем надеяться на то, что администрация президента Трампа все-таки определит свою позицию в этой сфере, и Россия, которая, несомненно, хочет улучшить отношения с США, тоже изменит свою позицию в конструктивном направлении. Спасибо.

Interpreter.And that’s why the book we’re contemplating today, in the situation when, no doubt, the relationships have become worse between our countries, but there’s hope that Mr. Trump’s, President Trump’s administration will define its position in this area and meet Russia – Russia that, no doubt, is interested in improving our relationships and, hopefully, will make changes, too.

Владимир Дворкин.Спасибо, Алексей.

Interpreter. Thank you very much, Alexey.

Владимир Дворкин.Bob, have you anything… Do you want to say?

Berls. Thank you, Vladimir. I just would like to say a few very…

Владимир Дворкин.Боб Берлз, представитель NTI.

Berls.A few general remarks, basically repeating some of the important points raised by my colleagues. And the one point that I would like to emphasize, which has already been mentioned several times, is the importance of dialog, and the importance of dialog in helping to rebuild trust, a task that is huge, considering the difficult situation our bilateral relationship is in today.

The cooperation that you see in the production of this book and the conference that took place in December of 2015, between the Luxembourg Forum and the Nuclear Threat Initiative, is an excellent example of the type of dialog that is necessary in order to just start moving in the right direction. And I would like to stress that this dialog, although very-very important and needs to continue, has to be expanded well beyond the scope of our types of organizations, and must penetrate both of our societies at all levels.

We’ve seen how difficult it is for governments to conduct a dialog. We’ve had our own experience at the non-governmental level, and have had success in conducting a productive series of seminars, conferences, and producing an excellent book. But, as I said, this dialog needs to continue at all levels, throughout civil society. It’s not just enough for government leaders and for experts to talk; the distrust is so huge and it penetrates so deeply into society that without an exchange of views, a dialog, throughout the various levels and layers of civil society, we’re not going to make much progress. So, while I very much commend the book, commend the work that we’re doing, I would also strongly encourage this dialog be expanded significantly throughout the civil society in the United States and in Russia. Thank you.

Владимир Дворкин.Спасибо, Боб. Я хотел бы попросить сказать несколько слов члену организационного комитета Люксембургского форума, человеку, который практически на себе несет значительную нагрузку по организации всех наших конференций, и в том числе и презентаций. Сергей Ознобищев!

Interpreter.I’m going to turn the floor to Sergey Oznobishchev; he is a member of the organizational committee of the Luxembourg Forum, he is the person who carries most of the load in preparing such events as this. Please, the floor is yours.

Ознобищев.Спасибо большое за теплые слова в мой адрес. Но что касается той тематики, которая мне досталась в этой книге, вы знаете, в момент проведения конференции всегда – это был конец 2015 года – всегда казалось, что будущее чуть более радужное, чем оно потом оказывается на самом деле.

Interpreter.So, thank you very much for your warm words, and let me say a few words about my part, my subject in this book. I just remember the end of 2015, when the future seemed so much brighter than it turned out to be.

Ознобищев.К сожалению, события развивались таким образом, что терроризм стал обыденной реальностью наших дней и практически событием чуть ли не ежедневным.

Interpreter.And regrettably, the events are such that terrorism has become a usual occurrence of our days today, basically a daily occurrence.

Ознобищев.И мы посвятили часть этой книги анализу катастрофического терроризма, его вероятности, то есть терроризм с применением оружия массового уничтожения.

Interpreter.And part of this book is devoted to the analysis of catastrophic terrorism, or terrorism with the use of the weapons of mass destruction.

Ознобищев.Тем самым мы попытались продлить в будущее тот анализ, который был начат уважаемым господином Уильямом Перри, бывшим министром обороны США и видным членом и NTI, и Люксембургского форума.

Interpreter.And thus we tried to extend the analysis that was begun by William Perry, the former Secretary of Defense and member of NTI and Luxembourg Forum.

Ознобищев.В одной из своих книг Уильям Перри пишет о том, что катастрофический терроризм возможен, вполне возможен в будущем, и предлагает целый набор средств и мероприятий, которые должны быть приняты на государственном уровне. И предлагал он это сделать в Соединенных Штатах в 1999 году.

Interpreter.And in one of his books William Perry writes about the catastrophic terrorism and its possibility in the future, and he proposes a series of measures on the governmental level that could be undertaken to prevent it, and that book was written in 1999 in the United States.

Ознобищев.К сожалению, мало что было сделано, и за этим, как мы все помним, последовали трагические события 2001 года, сентября.

Interpreter.And regrettably, little has been done since then, and then we have all witnessed the tragic events of September 11, 2001.

Ознобищев.Сейчас же можно говорить о том, что терроризм приобретает новую среду обитания.

Interpreter.Now we can say that terrorism has acquired a new habitat.

Ознобищев.Это и появление квазигосударства ИГИЛ, или ДАИШ.

Interpreter.And with it the appearance of the quasi-state ISIL, or Daesh.

Ознобищев.Это и внезапная совершенно волна беженцев, которая накрыла значительную часть Европы и часть мира.

Interpreter.And with it the sudden wave of the refugees, that has rushed over into Europe and other parts of the world.

Ознобищев.Что создает совершенно другое измерение для возможности терроризма, потому что часть этих людей оказывается уже заведомо завербованными, а часть представляет прекрасную среду для будущей вербовки для целей терроризма.

Interpreter.Which creates a whole new dimension for terrorists, because some of these people by definition are already recruited, and some of them present a very, very ripe opportunity for future recruitment.

Ознобищев.Сохраняются и так называемые традиционные угрозы применения террористических атак, которые хорошо описаны в специальной литературе.

Interpreter.Also remain the so-called regular threats of terrorism, which are well described in appropriate literature.

Ознобищев.Проведенный анализ по нескольким параметрам, а именно по возможности террористических атак в отношении самых опасных объектов инфраструктуры и по последствиям этих атак…

Interpreter.And there is an analysis of various parameters of the possibility for terrorism for infiltration of vital infrastructure and the possible consequences of such attacks.

Ознобищев.…привел нас к неутешительному выводу о том, что, возможно, наиболее вероятным объектом атаки может быть атомная электростанция и объекты атомной инфраструктуры.

Interpreter.And the sad conclusion of this analysis is that one such possible target could be a nuclear power plant or a nuclear facility or infrastructure.

Ознобищев.К сожалению, за прошедшее время адекватность такого анализа оправдалась, потому что обезвреженные, фактически обезвреженные посмертно террористы в Бельгии в марте 2016 года имели действительной целью своего нападения атомную электростанцию.

Interpreter.And the regrettable facts are that over the past few months we have been witnesses to the fact that this analysis has been correct; we have seen the disarmament of the two terrorists in Belgium in March of 2016, and we know that their final target was actually meant to be a nuclear plant.

Ознобищев.К сожалению, меры противодействия терроризму и катастрофическому терроризму достаточно очевидны и для экспертов, и даже для широкой публики.

Interpreter.And the methods for fighting this terrorism are rather obvious, not only for the experts, but also for the public at large.

Ознобищев.И эти меры в основе своей содержат очень важный элемент политического взаимодействия.

Interpreter.And these measures contain a very important element: the political interaction and cooperation.

Ознобищев.А это политическое взаимодействие и сегодня по-прежнему является всего лишь надеждой. Надеждой, к которой мы все стремимся и которая, мы надеемся, будет реализована.

Interpreter.And this political cooperation today remains a hope, a hope towards which we are all looking to and hoping that some day this will be realized.

Ознобищев.Спасибо.

Interpreter.Thank you.

Владимир Дворкин.Спасибо, Сергей. Я думаю, что… Есть ли необходимость нам дальше рассказывать о книжке? У меня просто есть опасение, что мы не успеем ответить на все вопросы наших корреспондентов и журналистов.

Interpreter.Thank you, Sergey. I now would like to wonder if we need to continue to talk about the book, otherwise we would not have enough time for all the questions and answers.

Владимир Дворкин.Спасибо всем выступившим. Я прошу представителей средств информации задать вопросы. Хорошо, если бы они были адресными, кому вы непосредственно задаете вопрос. Конкретный.

Interpreter.Thank you to all the presenters. Now, I would like to invite the members of the media to ask their questions, and I would appreciate if their questions are directed specifically at the people present. Ask your questions now.

Калинин.«Газета.Ру», Игнат Калинин.У меня вопрос, наверно, в первую очередь к Владимиру Петровичу Лукину как дипломату и политику, и также к лорду Брауну как политику. Вопрос такой: нынешняя администрация США – уже Трамп, по-моему, во время визита в Великобританию или во время какого-то интервью…

Interpreter.Hello, I represent Gazeta.Ru, and my question is for Vladimir Lukin, who is a diplomat and a politician, and my question pertains to the new administration. I know that Trump has already visited Great Britain…

Калинин.И во время этого визита он делал определенные посылы о том, что, возможно, строить отношения с Россией имеет смысл именно исходя из нового договора об ограничении вооружений.

Владимир Дворкин.Вопрос! Пожалуйста, задайте вопрос.

Калинин.Ну, он довольно пространный. Мне нужно все-таки…

Владимир Дворкин.Не надо, пространного не нужно. У нас просто не хватит… Конкретный вопрос.

Калинин.Хорошо, хорошо, конкретней вопрос. Каким образом Трампу, США и России начать вести переговоры в условиях, когда внутри страны, США, и также внутри Великобритании общественное мнение настроено крайне негативно по отношению к России и любые вопросы, любые взаимоотношения не будут иметь отзыва внутри страны?

Interpreter.So, my question is, in view of that visit, when Trump has expressed an interest in improving relations with Russia, how can Trump, how can American and Russian administrations begin negotiations when the public opinion is so negative towards Russia in the United States and in Great Britain?

Лукин.Переговоры особенно полезны, когда отношения плохие. Когда отношения хорошие, переговоры не обязательны.

Interpreter.Negotiations are particularly useful when the relations are bad. When the relations are good, then there’s really no need for any negotiations.

Лукин.Конечно, внутренняя политика влияет на переговоры, но не всегда прямо и непосредственно.

Interpreter.And of course internal policy influences negotiations, but not always directly.

Лукин.И соглашения, причем очень важные, между нашими странами заключались, как я уже говорил, во времена холодной войны, когда отношения не были блестящими.

Interpreter.And the agreements between our two countries, the very important agreements, were concluded during the times of the Cold War, when our relations were very negative, too.

Лукин.Например, президент Никсон, когда он был кандидатом, он очень острые позиции занимал в отношении тогдашнего Советского Союза по ряду вопросов, а потом стал практически одним из авторов разрядки международной напряженности. Таким образом, связи тут особой нет, я не вижу здесь прямой связи.

Interpreter.And, if I remember, President Nixon, when he was a candidate, he had a very rigid position regarding the USSR, but then he was also one of the authors of the many measures that dissipated the tension between our two countries. So, I don’t really see any direct correlation there.

Лукин.Хорошая атмосфера создается в том числе и результативными хорошими переговорами и теми отношениями, которые в них, в результате их возникают, вот так я бы сказал.

Interpreter.Good atmosphere is created as a result of good negotiations and the kinds of relationships that spring forth through those negotiations.

Владимир Дворкин.Пожалуйста, вопросы! По возможности короткие задавайте вопросы.

Interpreter.More questions, please! Try and keep them concise.

Дмитрак. Здравствуйте! «Интерфакс», Дмитрак Наталья. Я бы не стала, наверно, адресовать свой вопрос кому-то конкретному, но мне интересно мнение как российской, так и американской стороны. Во-первых, как вы оцениваете в целом вероятность завладения ядерным оружием или создания его ИГИЛ? Может ли это стать какой-то точкой для совместных действий России и Америки и для, собственно, объединения и поиска общих интересов? И в принципе, какие конкретно должны быть шаги или условия для восстановления доверия между нашими странами? Спасибо.

Interpreter.Thank you, I represent Interfax, and I have a question both to the Russian and American counterparts, about the possibility of nuclear weapons ending up in the hands of ISIS. What can we do, what kind of joint actions can the United States and Russia do together, how can they unify in their search of solutions and common interests? What specific steps, do you think, can be taken to build more trust between these two countries?

Владимир Дворкин.Я могу ответить на этот вопрос и прежде всего сказать о том, что я хорошо запомнил слова Грэма Эллисона. Это известный политический деятель, он был когда-то помощником министра обороны.

Interpreter.I can answer that question. I can remember also a quote from Graham Allison, who was a well-known and renowned politician, who was an assistant to the Secretary of Defense.

Владимир Дворкин.Так вот, он сказал, что он поражен, удивлен тем, что еще десять лет тому назад не произошел ядерный теракт.

Interpreter.And he said that he is amazed that a nuclear terrorist act had not happened ten years ago.

Владимир Дворкин.Настоящий ядерный теракт, не с какой-то «грязной бомбой». Потому что изготовить простейшее взрывное ядерное устройство пушечного типа не представляет никакого труда. Прямо на месте. Для этого нужно килограмм 20-25 оружейного урана. И за большой промежуток времени накопить разным путем – представляется это возможным. Поэтому нужно очень сильно укрепить совместную работу по предотвращению ядерного терроризма, обеспечить глобальный контроль за нелегальным перемещением радиоактивных материалов. Здесь целый спектр задач, которые можно и должны мы решать при нормальных взаимоотношениях.

Interpreter.And I’m talking about here real nuclear terrorism, not a dirty bomb, that can easily be constructed using 20-25 kilograms of weapons-grade uranium that could easily be amassed in a relatively short period of time. So, what we need to think about is reinforcing the joint efforts and cooperation between our two countries, making illegal transportation of radioactive materials much more difficult to do, and all of that can become gradually, come out of more active negotiations and from more improved relations between our two countries.

Владимир Дворкин.Пожалуйста, вопросы. What is your question?

Interpreter.Next questions, please!

Andrew. Could we just add a little bit to that response, if we could, please?

Rohlfing. Yeah, from an American perspective?

Владимир Дворкин.Yes. Excuse me, excuse me.

Andrew.Joan wants to go first then.

Rohlfing. Yeah, let me just offer, and then I’d like to offer Andrew an opportunity to share as well, but… The critical materials needed to make a nuclear weapon are plutonium or highly enriched uranium. If the terrorists can’t acquire sufficient quantities of either of those materials, there will be no bomb, so the most important thing we can do to prevent nuclear terrorism is to ensure that those materials are secured to the highest possible standard wherever they exist. Today those materials exist in 23 countries around the world; while that’s still a significant challenge, that is less than half of the number of countries that had weapons-usable nuclear materials in the early 1990s, so we’ve made significant progress, and much of that progress was made in partnership, the U.S. and Russia working together through the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program and through other vehicles by which we both helped to bring plutonium and highly enriched uranium back to our countries, that had originated in our countries and then was pushed out around the world.

Although the relationship has been very tense between our two countries and nuclear cooperation has come to a total halt, cooperation on nuclear materials security, in 2014, there is, I would say, a sign of hope in that we work together to achieve the joint comprehensive plan of action, the Iran Agreement, which was a major achievement. And because the Nuclear Threat Initiative has been primarily focused on finding ways to prevent nuclear terrorism, we have worked hard over the last year to develop a menu of options for cooperation on nuclear security in a recently issued report, and Andrew, if I could hand off to you, to say a little bit about some of the findings in that report? Called “Pathways to Cooperation”.

Andrew. Yes, yes. So, two comments. First – about the Luxembourg report. One of the things that I think is so important and so beneficial about the report is that it talks about how to prevent not only nuclear terrorism, but also radiological terrorism, and so it very importantly highlights that we have to be concerned about both of those issues, as was just mentioned by the General. We are extremely worried about ISIS getting nuclear and radiological materials, and in fact we at NTI released a radiological report (and then I’ll talk about this new report), and we highlighted that, given the stated interest by terrorist groups and the widespread availability of radiological sources which are located in more than 150 countries, it is nothing short of a miracle that we have not yet seen a dirty bomb attack. So, we have to work together, the United States and Russia have to work together in third countries to prevent ISIS from getting these materials.

Back to what Joan Rohlfing said, we have just released a report last month, entitled “Pathways to Cooperation”, where we spent a year working with our Russian colleagues and developed a very detailed tangible list, a menu of 51 different projects where the U.S. and Russia could work together on nuclear and radiological security. One of the top recommendations, back to your very good question, is, one of the areas that is recommended is that the U.S. and Russia work together in Central Asia. Central Asia has a very strong economic focus in countries like Turkmenistan, where they have a very large gas industry, they use thousands of radiological sources, but there is no cooperation in some of these Central Asian countries, and together the U.S. and Russia could work and really make significant progress, and we actually are planning on putting together a workshop in Kazakhstan with all the Central Asian countries on May 24th and May 25th, to try and do exactly that, have the U.S. and Russia work together to try and mitigate and reduce the likelihood of a dirty bomb. Thank you.

Владимир Дворкин.Thank you.

Question.May I ask a question? When this workshop may take place? When?

Andrew.Ah, the workshop is May 23rd to 25th of this year. So it’s going to be in about two months in Astana, and it’s already scheduled, and we also are bringing in the International Atomic Energy Agency, so it’s May 23rd to 25th of this year.

Владимир Дворкин.Please, questions! Your question!

Вопрос.Здравствуйте! Телеканал «Звезда». Я бы хотела задать вопрос господину Арбатову, но я думаю, что может ответить любой, кто захочет, в принципе. По поводу реакции администрации. Я знаю, что вы уже направили свое обращение, и неоднократно причем отправляли его, обоим президентам. Или, по крайней мере, я знаю, что со стороны российской администрации получили какую-то реакцию. Права я, или не было никакой реакции вообще на ваши рекомендации? Спасибо.

Interpreter.Thank you. I represent the TV channel Zvezda,and my question is to Mr. Arbatov, but anyone can answer that as well. What has been the reaction of the new administration? I know that you have sent your recommendations to both presidents. Has there been any reaction from the Russian administration, has there been any reaction from the U.S. administration?

Арбатов.У нас такая практика в Люксембургском форуме, и когда мы одни собираемся, и гораздо чаще мы собираемся с партнерами, мы всегда принимаем декларацию и направляем ее прежде всего президентам России и США, а также другим лидерам и основным международным организациям.

Interpreter.Our common practice, actually, in Luxembourg Forum, when we gather together or when we participate in various events with our partners, is, we put together a declaration that we send to both presidents of the Russian Federation, the United States, and also various other international forums and leaders.

Арбатов.На той совместной конференции, которая легла в основу книги, которую мы сегодня представляем, была принята совместная декларация, направленная по обычным адресам. Как уже здесь было сказано, в Соединенных Штатах это было принято позитивно, и вскоре правительство США обратилось к правительству России с предложениями сделать шаги в области контроля над ядерным оружием, а Российская Федерация эти предложения не приняла.

Interpreter.And the joint conference, on the basis of which we have produced this book before you, produced such a declaration that we sent the usual way to the two governments, and we received positive feedback from the U.S. government, which has made suggestions to the Russian Federation on various ways that negotiations and cooperation and various steps could be taken, but Russian Federation has flat out refused.

Арбатов.Но после этого мы собирались еще несколько раз и опять принимали обращения и направляли их. Иногда они воспринимаются положительно, но, как было сказано, в практическую политику пока не обращаются.

Interpreter.And afterwards we have met together several more times, and again we have put forth declarations, and sometimes we have received positive feedback to these declarations, but no specific policies have been produced as a result of those.

Арбатов.Но мы исходим из того, что капля точит камень, меняются люди во власти, меняются обстоятельства, и наша деятельность направлена на то, чтобы все-таки оказать воздействие на руководство двух ведущих стран и других государств и организаций, с тем чтобы сделать то, что мы считаем правильным.

Interpreter.However, with small steps we can go a mile, and people change, circumstances change, and we are trying to create an influence on leaders of the United States, and Russia, and other major organizations, and we believe that we are doing it the right way. The right thing, the right way.

Владимир Дворкин.Я могу добавить только, что в январе 2016 года в ответ на обращение наше, а оно было подписано известными во всем мире людьми, администрация Обамы предложила то, повторила то, что было в 2013 году. Обама предложил сократить стратегические силы до тысячи боезарядов и до пятисот развернутых носителей. Это было в 2013 году и в январе 2016 года. Наша сторона, российская, ответила отказом, с объяснением всех обычных возражений против дальнейших сокращений в связи с тем, что теперь сокращения нужно делать многосторонними, что нам мешают американская ПРО, «Глобальный удар», космос и санкции.

Interpreter.I would like to add here that in January of 2016 we have addressed the world leaders and in particular the United States and Russia, as we usually do, we sent petition signed by very famous people, and the Obama administration in 2013 has replied that they are willing to proceed forward with negotiations to reduce strategic arms, reduce them down to 1000 warheads or 500 deployed carriers. Russia, however, has refused to entertain this idea, citing the usual excuses, the objections against reductions of weapons, saying that it needs to be done on a multilateral level, that they have their concerns about the ABM, the space program and the sanctions.

Владимир Дворкин.Тем не менее, я согласен, как сказал Алексей, что наши надежды будут сокращаться последними.

Interpreter.However, I have to agree with Alexey, that hope will die last.

Владимир Дворкин.Вопросы!

Interpreter.More questions, please!

Владимир Дворкин.Пожалуйста, Виктор Литовкин!

Литовкин.Виктор Литовкин, ТАСС. У меня очень короткий вопрос. Какие сигналы мы можем ожидать, или шаги, чтобы появился оптимизм, что переговоры все-таки начнутся и они приведут к каким-нибудь реальным результатам? Спасибо.

Interpreter.Viktor Litovkin from TASS. What signals, what steps can we expect to see in the future, that could mean that negotiations are resuming and that we can expect some tangible results?

Владимир Дворкин.Des or Joan, who can reply to that question?

Rohlfing.So, I want to make the observation first, and this pertains to the last question as well, that, to state the obvious, we are still in the early days of the new administration in the United States. And we as Americans are watching very closely our own government to determine what positions, what policies it’s going to adopt when it comes to nuclear security. I myself am hopeful that the new administration will take the opportunity it has to build a much more constructive relationship with Russia on nuclear security issues. I think there are many different signals that we could look for; I think one thing that will be very telling is our president’s first meeting with your president. And hopefully they can build some rapport, a personal relationship, that will help facilitate the policy cooperation, the cooperation we’re going to need within the nuclear sphere to reduce the nuclear threat. So I hope that we see from both sides a signal of willingness, receptivity to beginning a dialog again. That for me would be very important. Did you want to add?

Browne.I just want to reinforce the point you make. These weapon systems hold a very important place in the structures of government or constitutions of countries who hold them, and those who occupy the highest offices in the land have a significant control over the policy in relation to them, so the signs will only come from that level in government, and they will be very obvious. But it’s unlikely that we will see any steps before the president of the United States meets the president of the Russian Federation. And I think it will be obvious to most observers that they are willing to engage in discussions or dialog about these very important matters, because if they do agree, they will tell the world. It’s improbable that they will not tell the world that they have achieved that in a dialog, so… Look out for that, but I don’t think it will be hidden anywhere when it happens.

Владимир Дворкин.Сенатор Лукин!

Interpreter.Senator Lukin, please!

Лукин.Мне кажется, что, конечно же, двусторонние переговоры на высшем уровне рано или поздно будут. Они всегда были, и они будут сейчас. И я думаю, что совершенно очевидно, что стратегическая проблематика будет одной из тем этих переговоров. Это практически нетрудно предположить.

Проблема, как я понимаю, состоит в том, что есть мнение о том, что надо активно начать двусторонний диалог, и есть то мнение, которое говорит о том, что нужно сейчас, в нынешних условиях, все-таки с учетом того, что много государств владеет так или иначе ядерным оружием, начинать многосторонний диалог. По моему мнению, противоречия между этими двумя формулами не существует, потому что, хотя существует проблема ядерной пролиферации…

Владимир Дворкин.Excuse me, excuse me. Translate, please.

Лукин.Извините, извините. Я был уверен, что в Вашингтоне все говорят по-русски, извините меня.

Interpreter.Sorry, I was absolutely convinced everybody spoke Russian in Washington, that’s why I kept going on, without letting the interpreter… Anyway, I personally believe that it’s time to start bilateral, improve bilateral relations, and there will be a time when high-level negotiations of that sort will transpire, as always been the case, and will certainly be now. The problem is… But the outcome is not easy to forecast, and I’m not going to undertake that. But there are different opinions on the subject. Some people believe that it’s time to resume the bilateral dialog, because it’s problematic at the moment; on the other hand, there’s an opinion that because a lot of states now possess nuclear weapons, it is time to start up a multilateral dialog. I don’t see any contradiction between two forms, so I think that may happen.

Лукин.Думаю, что с учетом того, что наши две страны владеют примерно 90% ядерного потенциала, то, конечно, инициативу должны проявить они, по возобновлению такого диалога, и если эта инициатива будет достаточно предметной и конструктивной, то она неизбежно приведет к тому, что и другие страны окажутся вовлеченными в эту инициативу.

Interpreter.Given the fact that our two countries possess about 90% of the nuclear potential, I think it’s going to be up to our countries to resume or to introduce the initiative of negotiating and talking, but the subject of those negotiations should be very specific and very constructive, and that should allow other countries to join in and get involved gradually.

Лукин.А без такой инициативы, я думаю, что негативные стимулы у этих стран «второго ряда», так сказать, будут преобладать над позитивными стимулами, и дело не сдвинется с места.

Interpreter.Without that initiative on the part of our two countries I believe that negative incentives for the second-tier countries will prevail, and nothing is going to move forward, unless the former happens.

Владимир Дворкин.Have you more questions?

Remark. Arnold wants to say something.

Arnold.Thank you. I believe my colleagues here know that I have not been attending last meetings over the last few years for medical reasons, and I’m glad to be resuming this seat, but it’s an honorary one, and I don’t know much about the previous conversations and dialog that’s taken place over the last couple of years. But… And perhaps this has all been covered many times, over and over again. But it seems to me that our relationship, the U.S. – Russian relationship has never been as adversarial as this since the Cold War. We all know this, and we know that that’s a fundamental obstacle also to getting on with the nuclear control, nuclear reductions talk and dialog. But it seems to me, we can’t simply hope that by keeping working on the margins – which are very-very important, because the marginal issues that we can work on now could turn out to be major issues if we don’t, if they are not handled. I think, looking at it from a U.S. perspective, I don’t think there’s going to be much of a chance to move forward toward serious dialog on arms control, unless some of the issues which are the major ones in behind the adversarial attitudes on both sides – both sides now. For example, I find it hard to believe that we could have a start in any serious nuclear arms discussions without first some resolution of the Ukrainian situation. I just don’t think that… I think that’s highly improbable. I can’t define for you what an acceptable resolution of that would be, but… And maybe I am speaking more from the vantage point of what the attitudes were during the Obama administration. We have an administration in the United States that, at least for me, is 85% unpredictable. So maybe that’s not true, maybe there’s a leapfrog option. I doubt it; I doubt it very much. So, my question, rather than an answer for my colleagues here, is, was there any attention given to that problem and the linkage, if you will, between resolving what is the most outstanding existing question in the U.S. and Russian-Western relations at the present time, and will that have to be addressed first?

Лукин.Я думаю, что все же марксистко-ленинская наука, которой меня учили в молодости, учит отличать существенное от менее существенного.

Interpreter.I would like to tell you the following: the Marxism-Leninism, Marxist-Leninist science that I learned when I was young taught me to be able to differentiate the essential from less essential.

Лукин.Все-таки всеобщая ядерная катастрофа – она более существенная проблема, чем даже очень острая проблема локального свойства.

Interpreter.A comprehensive nuclear disaster seems to be a far more acute problem than any local catastrophe or problem.

Лукин.Например, украинская проблема. Или проблема кипрская, например. Или проблема Нагорного Карабаха между Арменией и Азербайджаном.

Interpreter.Just to give an example, that could be the Ukrainian problem, or perhaps another example is Cyprus, or perhaps the issue of Nagorno-Karabakh.

Лукин.Не говоря уже о проблеме островов, на которые претендуют Англия и Аргентина до сих пор.

Interpreter.Let alone the problem of the islands that still Great Britain and Argentine are trying to claim.

Лукин.Вот, собственно говоря, и ответ.

Interpreter.And that was my answer.

Remark. Interesting answer.

ВладимирДворкин.Я могу только добавить, что кризис в сфере контроля ядерного вооружения возник еще до украинского кризиса.

Interpreter.I can only add that the nuclear arms control crisis emerged before the Ukrainian one.

Владимир Дворкин.То есть застой в этой сфере начался до кризиса в Украине, и украинский кризис только усилил противоречия. Во всех сферах.

Interpreter.Some kind of stagnation had started before the actual Ukrainian crisis, and what the Ukrainian crisis did was just to exacerbate the issue.

Владимир Дворкин.Пожалуйста, вопросы есть еще?

Interpreter.Any other questions, please.

Browne. Can I just engage with this one? I mean, I’m not an American or a Russian, but… I thought your point was very well made. And I don’t want anyone here to think that we are unaware of the importance of resolution of the Ukrainian crisis to advancing our ability between the West and the Russian Federation to move in many areas of public policy. But I just want to make two points about the way in which we certainly at NTI and in other organizations I’ve been involved and conducted business, which is, we never discuss Ukraine in the absence of Ukrainians. Because that is insulting to Ukrainians. It is not for others to resolve their country’s crisis and problems and tell them what the answers are. They will almost certainly be the wrong answers.

Арбатов.(?)I’m half Ukrainian, we can discuss that.

Browne. Yeah, well, we know that, we know that. But that’s not… That doesn’t address the issue. So, we do not have Ukrainian representatives, although we have a person here who is half Ukrainian, he reminds me, in this discussion.

And the second point is that we do engage with the challenges of Ukraine as the Nuclear Threat Initiative in other contexts, where we deliberately engage Ukrainians to discuss, in fact, in more than one forum we do that.

And my final point is that when we had this discussion in December, it would have been entirely inappropriate to have linked arms control to the resolution of Ukraine; there is an agreement, a Minsk agreement, which, many of our countries take the view, has to be enforced and respected, and others were dealing with that. So, that’s the contextual answer, but the point you make is very importantly made.

I just want to make one final point, which is, if some of the concerns we have about the effect on the control, the command and control of nuclear weapons and their materials actually materialize in the context of these deteriorated relationships, then, although Ukraine is a serious, serious problem, it will pale into insignificance beside what we will then be landed with.

So, we’re trying to say to people, “Please address your attention to this immediate existential threat and others; while we have these other problems that we need to address, but there are things that we can do now; they’re not where we would all like to get to, which is a world free of nuclear weapons, but they will improve the security of what we have at the moment, and they are immediate. Do not be in any other frame of mind, these are immediate.” So, I hope that to some degree helps you understand why we chose to do this, and why Ukraine was not prominently discussed and as little as referred to in the book. But your point is extremely well made, and I think you’re right that there would need to be another parallel process of confidence, which would address the issue of Ukraine before we could see the sort of progress we would like to see. But there are some things we could do now, in our own joint interests, that will markedly improve the security situation, that don’t involve us having to make them conditional on another bigger fish.

Rohlfing.I want to just quickly add my two cents on that. Thank you, Des, I agree with everything that you just said, and I’ll simply add that I think we are well aware of the many complications and many linked pieces that get in the way of our ability to achieve success in any particular area; in addition to Ukraine, we have very different perspectives on ballistic missile defense, on Prompt Global Strike, on balance of conventional forces. So, there are layers of issues, and if we wait to solve all of them before we tackle any of them individually, we’ll never get anywhere; so, I think, we have to look for opportunities and in these areas of existential common interest move as quickly and with as much commitment as possible.

Владимир Дворкин.Thank you, Joan.

Remark.Arnold wishes to come back.

Владимир Дворкин. Arnie, you have questions?

Arnold.Well, I just wanted to explain that…

Владимир Дворкин.A comment?

Arnold.Yes. I was not suggesting that the work of the forum or NTI must wait a solution of the Ukraine problem; I was simply adding something to the background discussion and pointing out a major issue that’s in the way, and practically, in my opinion, practically, the likelihood of a serious dialog on the big nuclear control questions is not going to happen unless something happens on the Ukrainian issue.

Владимир Дворкин.Thank you, Arnie. Have you comments, my colleagues? Спасибо всем представителям прессы, у нас больше нет вопросов. Всех благодарю!

Interpreter.Thank you very much, all the representatives of mass media.