Презентация совместной книги Международного Люксембургского форума и фонда «Инициатива по снижению ядерной угрозы» (“NTI”, США) «Предотвращение кризиса в контроле над ядерными вооружениями и катастрофический терроризм»

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Владимир Дворкин. Дорогие коллеги и уважаемые участники средств массовой информации!

Interpreter. Dear colleagues and respected representatives of mass media!

Владимир Дворкин. Я Владимир Дворкин, председатель организационного комитета Люксембургского форума.

Interpreter. My name is Vladimir Dvorkin, I’m the Chairman of the Luxembourg Forum.

Владимир Дворкин. И мне поручено открыть презентацию нашей книжки.

Interpreter. I’ve been asked to open the presentation of our book.

Владимир Дворкин. Название книжки вам известно, вы ее видели. И эта книга подготовлена по результатам совместной конференции.

Interpreter. You know the name, the title of the book, you’ve seen it, and it’s been prepared following the results of a joint conference.

Владимир Дворкин. Люксембургского форума и Фонда «Инициатива по уменьшению ядерной угрозы».

Interpreter. Of the Luxembourg Forum and NTI, the Common Threat Reduction Initiative.

Владимир Дворкин. Конференция прошла в декабре 2015 года.

Interpreter. The conference took place in December of 2015.

Владимир Дворкин. На ней было согласовано совместное заявление двух организаций с предложениями по необходимым первоочередным шагам.

Interpreter. The two organizations came up with an approved statement on their behalf that expressed the next steps, priority, high-priority steps to be taken.

Владимир Дворкин. Это заявление было незамедлительно представлено президентам России и Соединенных Штатов.

Interpreter. That statement was passed on immediately to the presidents of Russia and the United States.

Владимир Дворкин. И уже в январе 2016 года последовала реакция на это заявление.

Interpreter. And there was a response to that statement as early as January of 2016.

Владимир Дворкин. Если кому-нибудь придет в голову мысль, что это теперь уже не актуально, то пусть он бросит в меня камень. Или микрофон, что легче.

Interpreter. If anyone happens to think that that subject has lost its validity today, let him throw a stone at me, or perhaps a microphone.

Владимир Дворкин. Но не надо сразу бросать, а сначала посмотрите эту книжку и послушайте, что вам скажут авторы заявления и книги.

Interpreter. But please don’t go about tossing that mike at me right away; first, take a look at the book, and perhaps you’ll learn from what the authors of the book have to tell you and explain.

Владимир Дворкин. Авторы книжки: Сэм Нанн, Вячеслав Кантор, Алексей Арбатов, Линтон Брукс, Сергей Ознобищев, Анатолий Дьяков, Эндрю Вебер, Мартимер(?), а также я.

Interpreter. Among the authors of the book are: Senator Nunn, Mr. Kantor, myself, Mr. Oznobishchev… And the other names you’ve just heard.

Владимир Дворкин. Я не буду представлять всех авторов и участников конференции, авторов и книжки, и заявления. Вы их хорошо знаете, это известные в мире люди.

Interpreter. I do not intend to introduce all the authors of the book and the statement that was issued at that time; you all know them very well, these people are very well known and famous around the world.

Владимир Дворкин. Книжка содержит доклады и статьи практически по основным вопросам в нашей сфере деятельности.

Interpreter. The book contains reports and articles that cover all the main issues, burning issues in our area of expertise and knowledge.

Владимир Дворкин. По проблемам глобальных и региональных угроз; контроль ядерных вооружений; предотвращение ядерного и биологического терроризма; по кибербезопасности; по укреплению режима ядерного нераспространения.

Interpreter. The book contains the most important issues, and that’s the nuclear arms control, the prevention of terrorism, both conventional and biological, various cyber issues and issues of non-proliferation.

Владимир Дворкин. Конечно, после выборов в Соединенных Штатах по позиции новой администрации и программам действий обстановка остается весьма неопределенной.

Interpreter. No doubt, after the most recent election in the United States and the new administration coming in, we have to acknowledge that the general tone, the general situation remains uncertain.

Владимир Дворкин. Я не могу прогнозировать ее развитие; может быть, это могут сделать более опытные политологи, присутствующие здесь.

Interpreter. I will not undertake to try to forecast further developments, and perhaps some of the political analysts present here will assume that responsibility.

Владимир Дворкин. Однако надо иметь в виду, что в любом случае основные выводы и предложения обращения и содержание книги сделаны на основе богатейшего опыта и представления принципов стратегической стабильности.

Interpreter. But it has to be borne in mind that the most of the proposals and remarks offered in that book and the contents of the book have been made on the basis of the wealth of experience and extensive knowledge in the area of strategic stability.

Владимир Дворкин. И только соблюдая и развивая эти принципы можно обеспечить приемлемый уровень международной безопасности.

Interpreter. There’s only one way to maintain an acceptable level of international security, and that way is to develop and expand those principles expressed.

Владимир Дворкин. Я предлагаю сейчас сделать краткие заявления некоторым участникам конференции, авторам книги и заявления, после чего представители информационных средств могут задать вопросы. На которые, может быть, даже получат ответы.

Interpreter. I’m going to suggest that the authors of the book come up with short explanations, presentations or remarks; after that, I’m going to give an opportunity to mass media to ask questions and perhaps, hopefully, get some answers.

Владимир Дворкин. Des, you… First speaker.

Browne. OK. So, thank you, Sergey, colleagues. Ladies and gentleman, I am Des Browne, I am also a member of the House of Lords in the United Kingdom, and formally was the Secretary of State for Defense in the United Kingdom. I am the vice chair of NTI and involved in other organizations who work in this general space of Euro-Atlantic security.

My first task is to offer the apologies of the chair and chief executive of NTI, Senator Sam Nunn, who participated in this forum conference, Luxembourg Forum conference, and is delighted to see the publication of this book of the papers that were presented for our discussions; unfortunately, owing to family commitments, he cannot be with us today, but he sends his support, along with his apologies that he cannot be with you, and his continued commitment to the agenda that we are going to be discussing.

I do not intend to deal with any of the individual papers in this book; the authors of those papers are in the room, and they should have responsibility for their own words and the credit for the arguments and proposals that they have put forward, but I do want to just say, with the permission of everybody present, a few words about why I am so proud to be involved with the Luxembourg Forum and my colleagues here and friends who are involved in this initiative and agenda.

As General Dvorkin made clear in his opening remarks, everyone is aware of the deterioration of relations between the Russian Federation and the West generally. That chasm of lack of confidence and trust appears to have widened, and to be probably wider now, in some people’s estimation, than at any time during much of the Cold War. This is a very dangerous set of circumstances, but despite these differences there continue to be areas of existential common interests that have to be addressed, because the circumstances that this book addresses continue to exist, and they continue to exist in an unstable environment, where there are no longer the certainties that there were before.

So, I mean, as we did during the darkest days of the Cold War, we must work together to avoid catastrophic consequences, including preventing terrorist attacks with the use of these materials, or by reducing the risks of military or even nuclear conflict in the space that we all occupy.

Since their respective inceptions, the Nuclear Threat Initiative and the International Luxembourg Forum have been involved in Euro-Atlantic security, some of us individually inside government, but certainly all of us outside government collectively recognizing the importance of dialogue and the importance of sharing our concerns and thinking and coming to recommendations that can be jointly supported and presented to our respective governments.

So, the statement of the conference which General Dvorkin referred to was presented to the White House, and we know that attention was paid to it, but, as the General has pointed out, since then has been a very important election here in the United States, and there is an uncertainty about what the approach of the current administration will be to the issues that most concern us about the security of this space.

I just say this: that with the uncertainty comes opportunity. We were told this week by a representative of the administration that old nuclear policy is under review, and that it will be under review for some time, and in the context of that review we certainly at the Nuclear Threat Initiative, you know, intend to present, among others, some of the recommendations of this conference to those involved in the review, so that there may be inner considerations.

I think our collective experience says that the lack of trust and confidence is such at this time that we must find areas, advance our common interests, identify and pursue concrete and practical near-term initiatives which are designed to reduce immediate risks, and that the involvement in them bilaterally will not reduce anybody’s own perception of the security, and thereby rebuild trust and improve the Euro-Atlantic security landscape at the same time.

So, I just want to share with you, and some of these recommendations are reflections of papers that were presented to us in the areas where we found common cause, a few near-term practical steps that we think are both urgent and necessary; I will not go into them in detail, but just refer to them.

So, we must reduce the danger of a nuclear weapon being used, in any circumstances, even if it is accidentally. And there are many experts who are assessing that that risk is increasing rather than reducing in the current environment. So, even an accidental launch, the risk of the use of these weapons is unnecessarily high, in our view, and we recommend that leaders revisit a joint position that a nuclear war cannot be won and must therefore never be fought. We think that that joint expression of a position that instructed the approach for much of the Cold War to arms control and considerations would be a very good starting point. It would do no harm if our respective leaders across the Euro-Atlantic space signed up to that commitment.

We believe we must reduce the risk of nuclear weapons on prompt launch. There are too many weapons in significant numbers in the space that we live in which are minutes from launch. And we do not believe that that posture is necessary for the current status; and that it should be backed off from. And we must reduce the threat of radiological materials which are dispersed for many purposes across our space, and in many cases not that well secured; we must significantly reduce the threat of these falling into the wrong hands. We know that the Islamic State, whatever you call it, ISIS or ISIL, is aware of the danger of this material to us, and they have expressed publicly their interest in getting their hands on it, and suggested even, when they took over Mosul, that they had taken the material out of the hospital. So, whether they did or not, I don’t know, and I have not seen evidence, but certainly they know the terror effect of this material.

We must work on reducing military confrontation in the space that we are jointly exercising and operating in, in the borders between NATO and the Russian Federation, and we must reduce the risk of a mid-air incident, which is increased significantly by the increased number of flights by military aircraft which do not have the transponders on.

So, we propose these simple steps which do not undermine anyone’s individual security on any perception of the security as a way forward, but we collectively believe that returning to an environment in which arms control was a significant part of our collective security is the space that we must seek out again. So, I thank all of those who were involved with us in the conference, and maintain this constant agenda of dialog and discussion about some of the most difficult things in the world, and I commend the Luxembourg Forum, which I’ve been involved with for some time now, for the work that it does. Thank you.

Владимир Дворкин. Thank you, Des. Я должен сказать, что, ранее министр обороны, лорд Дес Браун – член наблюдательного совета Люксембургского форума, и он весьма активен на всех наших заседаниях, в нашей деятельности, вносит большой вклад в формирование нашей позиции, Люксембургского форума. Спасибо, Дес.

Interpreter. Let me just add, Des Browne used to be a defense minister, minister of defense, and he’s also a member of the supervisory council, he’s always been very active working with us, has made a vast contribution. Thank you very much, Des.

Browne. Thank you.

Владимир Дворкин. Слово сенатору Владимиру Лукину, ранее послу России в Соединенных Штатах, и у него еще очень много других постов. Пожалуйста!

Interpreter. I’m going to turn it over to Mr. Lukin, formerly the Ambassador of the Russian Federation in the United States; he’s got many more positions and ranks that I’m not going to enumerate here. Please, go ahead.

Лукин. Я очень рад присутствовать здесь, на этом важном событии.

Interpreter. I’m really glad to be able to attend this very important event.

Лукин. И не только потому, что здесь я вижу много старых друзей иных времен, но и потому, что тема, о которой идет речь, одна из стержневых, центральных тем мировой политики, причем тема не конъюнктурная, а именно тема принципиально важная и долговременная.

Interpreter. I am glad not just because I see old faces here, from former times, but also because the subject matter of this conference includes the core issues of world politics, not because just a trite subject matter that’s going to go away very quickly, but because it’s something that really underlies world politics and will do so for many years to come.

Лукин. Я предпочитаю говорить по-русски не только потому, что это язык, который я знаю лучше всех остальных, но и потому, что в Вашингтоне последнее время он звучит реже, о чем я лично очень сожалею.

Interpreter. I would prefer to speak Russian now, not only because I know Russian better than English, I think, but also for the reason that more recently the Russian language has not been frequently used in Washington, D.C., which I’m very sorry about.

Лукин. Я был долгое время, довольно долгое время активным участником процесса NTI и очень горд тем, что работал с такими выдающимися людьми, как сенаторы Нанн и Лугар, как Уильям Перри и многие, многие другие.

Interpreter. For quite a while I’ve been an active participant in the NTI process, and I’m very proud of being able to do so and to work together with such outstanding personalities as Senator Nunn, Lugar, Mr. William Perry and many-many others.

Лукин. Но, поскольку хорошие друзья, хорошие предприятия, подобно древним животным, размножаются делением, то вот Люксембургский был форум – стал еще одним важным делом в этом процессе ограничения стратегических вооружений.

Interpreter. And just remembering that the ancient organisms, the way that they spread around and propagate is by dividing themselves, this is exactly what’s been happening to the Luxembourg Forum, it has been expanding and encompassing more and more structures.

Лукин. И я очень рад, что принимаю посильное участие в этой важной международной акции.

Interpreter. And I’m really glad that I’m being able to contribute as much as I can to this important event.

Лукин. Но я думаю, что политическая конъюнктура меняется, и была – в свое время разоруженческие процессы стояли в центре наших двусторонних отношений.

Interpreter. Everybody understands that the political agenda keeps changing and fluctuating; there was a time once when disarmament was the center stage of our relationships.

Лукин. Затем начался целый период, когда была преобладающей точка зрения, что эти процессы как бы отошли на второй план и были заслонены другими аспектами злобы дня.

Interpreter. And then there was a time, there was a period of time with the predominant view that those issues should be in the background of our discussions, and other important issues took their place.

Лукин. Но как бы ни было, как бы ни менялось восприятие тех процессов, сама-то ситуация MAD, Mutual Assured Destruction, она остается неизменной.

Interpreter. And no matter how much perception changes, the essence, the check and mate of this thing, the Mutual Assured Destruction, continues to be center stage.

Лукин. И если не концентрировать внимание на каких-то усилиях по прогрессу в этом деле, прогрессу в создании препятствий на пути дальнейшему бесконтрольному вооружению, и количественному, и качественному, то мы, конечно, придем к ужасному концу.

Interpreter. And of course, if we fail to focus on some progress resolving these issues, and fail to install impediments in the way of this uncontrollable, what seems to be uncontrollable process, both quantitatively and qualitatively, we’re going to end up in a terrible, in a horrible situation.

Лукин. Международные соглашения в этой области либо устаревают и не возобновляются, либо явно не заключаются, хотя они необходимы, на новой основе, в новых условиях.

Interpreter. International agreements and treaties in this area become either outdated or don’t get resumed; but anyway, they don’t get discussed and signed, perhaps on a new foundation or basis.

Лукин. Ядерное распространение, несмотря на отдельные локальные успехи, все же движется в целом в неблагоприятном направлении.

Interpreter. Nuclear proliferation, in spite of some random successes, has been moving in a generally unfavorable direction.

Лукин. Самое главное, пожалуй, что очень волнует, это то, что накопленный потенциал доверия в этой области между двумя странами, который распространялся и на другие сферы их отношений, даже в условиях холодной войны, – этот потенциал уменьшается и стремится к нулю.

Interpreter. What really concerns us a lot is that the trust potential that had been accumulated and was spilling over to other aspects of life and relationships, despite the Cold War around, has now got a tendency to move towards becoming a zero.

Лукин. Поэтому книга, которую мы сейчас берем в руки, рассматриваем с большим вниманием, книга, написанная выдающимися авторами, очень своевременно обращает наше внимание на эту самую важную и нерешенную проблему.

Interpreter. That’s why the book that you’re just going to pick up and read, written by outstanding people and personalities, is very timely and really calls our attention to this unresolved, but extremely significant issue.

Лукин. Поэтому разрешите мне от души поздравить всех авторов этой книги. Они делают очень важное дело.

Interpreter. Let me congratulate all the authors and the people involved in this book from the bottom of my heart; I think they’ve done a very important job.

Лукин. И пожелать им и всем нам увидеть серьезные и конкретные результаты их усилий в возможно более близком будущем.

Interpreter. I wish they and all of us will be able to see very specific, very tangible results of the fruit of their labor in the not-so-distant future.

Лукин. От этого зависит будущее нас, наших детей, а с учетом среднего возраста присутствующих за этим столом – и наших внуков.

Interpreter. And of course that’s what the future, our future, the future of our children and also, given the average age of the people sitting in this room, our grandchildren – all of that depends on the results of that effort.

Лукин. Спасибо.

Interpreter. Thank you so much.

Владимир Дворкин. Thank you, Владимир Петрович. Я хотел бы попросить сейчас выступить президента и директора Фонда «Инициатива по уменьшению ядерной угрозы» Джоан Ролфинг(?).

Interpreter. I’m going to turn the floor to the director of NTI now.

Rohlfing. Thank you very much. On behalf of the Nuclear Threat Initiative, I want to thank the Luxembourg Forum for your partnership on this important project; my thanks also to the authors who contributed to this important book. I’m going to echo themes of the previous speakers on this panel; although we did not coordinate our points, I find it interesting that we’re hearing the same themes emerge from one speaker to the next, to the next. And that is the need to overcome the lack of trust that has developed between our two nations, and a path forward to surmount this growing nuclear competition that is making the world a much more dangerous place.

We assemble here at a very precarious time; as mentioned, we have this growing political tension between the two biggest nuclear powers in the world, and there is a dangerous absence of dialog on a threat that is existential for us. Alexey Arbatov reminded me within the last day that we’re entering a period where we’ve now gone six years without any dialog, any negotiation between our two countries on the nuclear threat. This is the longest period of time since we began negotiations in 1969 on the SALT Treaty. And it’s a very dangerous position to be in, because at the same time we have this growing distrust, there’s been an erosion of the existing arms control instruments that have stabilized the threat, provided a system of constraints over nearly a 50-year period now. So we stand at the precipice of the potential disintegration of the arms control regimes that have served us over a multi-decadal period, and potentially we find ourselves entering a period where we have no limits, no constraints on our nuclear weapons.

So it’s important to raise awareness about these threats, and that’s one of the reasons this book is so important. We need to work to rebuild the atmosphere that enables us to improve political relations between our two countries, and I found it interesting that our previous speakers have all mentioned the need to find near-term practical steps, the wish for tangible results to help us reach a better place.

My hope is that through this work and through some of the innovative ideas contained in this book that we’ll be able to resume dialog, and arms control negotiations in particular, to ensure that the stabilizing constraints that we carefully developed and built and have observed over now many decades will stay in place.

So, I’m encouraged by the fact that we can gather here together as partners, Americans and Russians, in the spirit of cooperation, with the desire to find a path forward, and that gives me hope that our governments will do the same thing. Thank you very much.

Владимир Дворкин. Thank you, Joan. Я попрошу сейчас сказать несколько слов одному из основных авторов книжки, академику Алексею Арбатову. Пожалуйста.

Interpreter. I’m going to turn it over to one of the principal authors of the book, academician Arbatov. Please!

Арбатов. Спасибо. С того момента, когда мы обсуждали вопросы на совместной конференции Люксембургского форума и NTI, прошел год и несколько месяцев, почти полтора года.

Interpreter. There’s been almost a year and a few months, let’s say a year and a half, since the time we had the joint conference between the Luxembourg Forum and NTI.

Арбатов. Но, к сожалению, эта книга остается не менее, а еще более актуальной.

Interpreter. Regretfully, the issues taken up, they have not diminished, but on the contrary, they’ve become even more significant.

Арбатов. Я говорю «к сожалению», потому что за это время не было сделано ни единого шага в направлении поддержания режима контроля над ядерным оружием и режима нераспространения ядерного оружия.

Interpreter. And I’m using the word “regretfully” because not a single step has been taken over this period of time to make any improvements in the arms control regime and in non-proliferation regime.

Арбатов. Этот режим и процесс похож на велосипед: на нем нельзя стоять на месте. Или можно двигаться вперед, пусть не быстрыми темпами, но все-таки двигаться, или вы неизбежно упадете. И так же процесс: или должен продолжаться, или он начинает распадаться, что мы сейчас и видим.

Interpreter. Those regimes run like a well-oiled bicycle: it cannot be at a standstill. If you stop moving the pedals, you’re going to end up falling off, and that’s exactly what’s happening to those regimes, and that’s what we are witnessing today.

Арбатов. Наибольшая угроза нависла над договором о ракетах средней и меньшей дальности, INF Treaty.

Interpreter. The worst kind of danger looms over the INF Treaty, the medium and small range missiles.

Арбатов. Этот договор уникален в том, что он явился основой процесса быстрого сокращения ядерного оружия, который начался именно с этого договора тридцать лет назад.

Interpreter. And that’s a unique treaty in many respects, as it served as the basis for rapid reduction of nuclear weapons, the process that started about thirty years ago.

Арбатов. Благодаря этому договору последовали другие важные соглашения, и в результате за прошедшие тридцать лет у нас сейчас в мире ядерного оружия почти в десять раз меньше, чем было тогда.

Interpreter. Other important treaties and agreements followed suit, and over the thirty years that have passed we ended up in a situation when the number of nuclear weapons is tenfold less today than what we used to have at that time.

Арбатов. Но последние шесть лет процесс остановился, и режим начал распадаться.

Interpreter. However, in the very last six years that process has come to a standstill, and the regime has started to fall apart.

Арбатов. До президентских выборов в США активную роль играла администрация Обамы, предлагая России сделать новые шаги в этой области, но Россия от этого отказывалась.

Interpreter. Before the new administration the Obama administration had been making suggestions aimed at Russia, in terms of taking new steps in this area, but Russia refused to follow suit.

Арбатов. Россия использовала некоторые аргументы; одни можно признать справедливыми, другие были просто отговорками, но во всяком случае Россия не реагировала на эти предложения.

Interpreter. In response, Russia came up with some objections, some of them could be considered sound enough, others were merely excuses, but, in a word, Russia turned down those offers.

Арбатов. Сейчас сменилась администрация в США.

Interpreter. There’s a new administration in the United States now.

Арбатов. Нет никакой уверенности, что она будет активно продолжать линию предыдущей администрации. Скорее наоборот.

Interpreter. And there’s no certainty that it will continue with the political line that the former administration had been pursuing; more likely, the opposite will happen.

Арбатов. Если в этих условиях Россия не изменит свою позицию, которую я называю оборонительно-негативной, то через несколько лет ничего не останется от всего режима контроля над ядерным оружием.

Interpreter. If Russia doesn’t alter in some ways its position, current position, and I call that position “defensively negative”, in a few years what we’re going to end up with is just mere nothing left of the nuclear arms control regime.

Арбатов. Поэтому книга, к сожалению, остается актуальной; ситуация сейчас хуже, чем была полтора года назад. Но будем надеяться на то, что администрация президента Трампа все-таки определит свою позицию в этой сфере, и Россия, которая, несомненно, хочет улучшить отношения с США, тоже изменит свою позицию в конструктивном направлении. Спасибо.

Interpreter. And that’s why the book we’re contemplating today, in the situation when, no doubt, the relationships have become worse between our countries, but there’s hope that Mr. Trump’s, President Trump’s administration will define its position in this area and meet Russia – Russia that, no doubt, is interested in improving our relationships and, hopefully, will make changes, too.

Владимир Дворкин. Спасибо, Алексей.

Interpreter. Thank you very much, Alexey.

Владимир Дворкин. Bob, have you anything… Do you want to say?

Berls. Thank you, Vladimir. I just would like to say a few very…

Владимир Дворкин. Боб Берлз, представитель NTI.

Berls. A few general remarks, basically repeating some of the important points raised by my colleagues. And the one point that I would like to emphasize, which has already been mentioned several times, is the importance of dialog, and the importance of dialog in helping to rebuild trust, a task that is huge, considering the difficult situation our bilateral relationship is in today.

The cooperation that you see in the production of this book and the conference that took place in December of 2015, between the Luxembourg Forum and the Nuclear Threat Initiative, is an excellent example of the type of dialog that is necessary in order to just start moving in the right direction. And I would like to stress that this dialog, although very-very important and needs to continue, has to be expanded well beyond the scope of our types of organizations, and must penetrate both of our societies at all levels.

We’ve seen how difficult it is for governments to conduct a dialog. We’ve had our own experience at the non-governmental level, and have had success in conducting a productive series of seminars, conferences, and producing an excellent book. But, as I said, this dialog needs to continue at all levels, throughout civil society. It’s not just enough for government leaders and for experts to talk; the distrust is so huge and it penetrates so deeply into society that without an exchange of views, a dialog, throughout the various levels and layers of civil society, we’re not going to make much progress. So, while I very much commend the book, commend the work that we’re doing, I would also strongly encourage this dialog be expanded significantly throughout the civil society in the United States and in Russia. Thank you.

Владимир Дворкин. Спасибо, Боб. Я хотел бы попросить сказать несколько слов члену организационного комитета Люксембургского форума, человеку, который практически на себе несет значительную нагрузку по организации всех наших конференций, и в том числе и презентаций. Сергей Ознобищев!

Interpreter. I’m going to turn the floor to Sergey Oznobishchev; he is a member of the organizational committee of the Luxembourg Forum, he is the person who carries most of the load in preparing such events as this. Please, the floor is yours.

Ознобищев. Спасибо большое за теплые слова в мой адрес. Но что касается той тематики, которая мне досталась в этой книге, вы знаете, в момент проведения конференции всегда – это был конец 2015 года – всегда казалось, что будущее чуть более радужное, чем оно потом оказывается на самом деле.

Interpreter. So, thank you very much for your warm words, and let me say a few words about my part, my subject in this book. I just remember the end of 2015, when the future seemed so much brighter than it turned out to be.

Ознобищев. К сожалению, события развивались таким образом, что терроризм стал обыденной реальностью наших дней и практически событием чуть ли не ежедневным.

Interpreter. And regrettably, the events are such that terrorism has become a usual occurrence of our days today, basically a daily occurrence.

Ознобищев. И мы посвятили часть этой книги анализу катастрофического терроризма, его вероятности, то есть терроризм с применением оружия массового уничтожения.

Interpreter. And part of this book is devoted to the analysis of catastrophic terrorism, or terrorism with the use of the weapons of mass destruction.

Ознобищев. Тем самым мы попытались продлить в будущее тот анализ, который был начат уважаемым господином Уильямом Перри, бывшим министром обороны США и видным членом и NTI, и Люксембургского форума.

Interpreter. And thus we tried to extend the analysis that was begun by William Perry, the former Secretary of Defense and member of NTI and Luxembourg Forum.

Ознобищев. В одной из своих книг Уильям Перри пишет о том, что катастрофический терроризм возможен, вполне возможен в будущем, и предлагает целый набор средств и мероприятий, которые должны быть приняты на государственном уровне. И предлагал он это сделать в Соединенных Штатах в 1999 году.

Interpreter. And in one of his books William Perry writes about the catastrophic terrorism and its possibility in the future, and he proposes a series of measures on the governmental level that could be undertaken to prevent it, and that book was written in 1999 in the United States.

Ознобищев. К сожалению, мало что было сделано, и за этим, как мы все помним, последовали трагические события 2001 года, сентября.

Interpreter. And regrettably, little has been done since then, and then we have all witnessed the tragic events of September 11, 2001.

Ознобищев. Сейчас же можно говорить о том, что терроризм приобретает новую среду обитания.

Interpreter. Now we can say that terrorism has acquired a new habitat.

Ознобищев. Это и появление квазигосударства ИГИЛ, или ДАИШ.

Interpreter. And with it the appearance of the quasi-state ISIL, or Daesh.

Ознобищев. Это и внезапная совершенно волна беженцев, которая накрыла значительную часть Европы и часть мира.

Interpreter. And with it the sudden wave of the refugees, that has rushed over into Europe and other parts of the world.

Ознобищев. Что создает совершенно другое измерение для возможности терроризма, потому что часть этих людей оказывается уже заведомо завербованными, а часть представляет прекрасную среду для будущей вербовки для целей терроризма.

Interpreter. Which creates a whole new dimension for terrorists, because some of these people by definition are already recruited, and some of them present a very, very ripe opportunity for future recruitment.

Ознобищев. Сохраняются и так называемые традиционные угрозы применения террористических атак, которые хорошо описаны в специальной литературе.

Interpreter. Also remain the so-called regular threats of terrorism, which are well described in appropriate literature.

Ознобищев. Проведенный анализ по нескольким параметрам, а именно по возможности террористических атак в отношении самых опасных объектов инфраструктуры и по последствиям этих атак…

Interpreter. And there is an analysis of various parameters of the possibility for terrorism for infiltration of vital infrastructure and the possible consequences of such attacks.

Ознобищев. …привел нас к неутешительному выводу о том, что, возможно, наиболее вероятным объектом атаки может быть атомная электростанция и объекты атомной инфраструктуры.

Interpreter. And the sad conclusion of this analysis is that one such possible target could be a nuclear power plant or a nuclear facility or infrastructure.

Ознобищев. К сожалению, за прошедшее время адекватность такого анализа оправдалась, потому что обезвреженные, фактически обезвреженные посмертно террористы в Бельгии в марте 2016 года имели действительной целью своего нападения атомную электростанцию.

Interpreter. And the regrettable facts are that over the past few months we have been witnesses to the fact that this analysis has been correct; we have seen the disarmament of the two terrorists in Belgium in March of 2016, and we know that their final target was actually meant to be a nuclear plant.

Ознобищев. К сожалению, меры противодействия терроризму и катастрофическому терроризму достаточно очевидны и для экспертов, и даже для широкой публики.

Interpreter. And the methods for fighting this terrorism are rather obvious, not only for the experts, but also for the public at large.

Ознобищев. И эти меры в основе своей содержат очень важный элемент политического взаимодействия.

Interpreter. And these measures contain a very important element: the political interaction and cooperation.

Ознобищев. А это политическое взаимодействие и сегодня по-прежнему является всего лишь надеждой. Надеждой, к которой мы все стремимся и которая, мы надеемся, будет реализована.

Interpreter. And this political cooperation today remains a hope, a hope towards which we are all looking to and hoping that some day this will be realized.

Ознобищев. Спасибо.

Interpreter. Thank you.

Владимир Дворкин. Спасибо, Сергей. Я думаю, что… Есть ли необходимость нам дальше рассказывать о книжке? У меня просто есть опасение, что мы не успеем ответить на все вопросы наших корреспондентов и журналистов.

Interpreter. Thank you, Sergey. I now would like to wonder if we need to continue to talk about the book, otherwise we would not have enough time for all the questions and answers.

Владимир Дворкин. Спасибо всем выступившим. Я прошу представителей средств информации задать вопросы. Хорошо, если бы они были адресными, кому вы непосредственно задаете вопрос. Конкретный.

Interpreter. Thank you to all the presenters. Now, I would like to invite the members of the media to ask their questions, and I would appreciate if their questions are directed specifically at the people present. Ask your questions now.

Калинин. «Газета.Ру», Игнат Калинин. У меня вопрос, наверно, в первую очередь к Владимиру Петровичу Лукину как дипломату и политику, и также к лорду Брауну как политику. Вопрос такой: нынешняя администрация США – уже Трамп, по-моему, во время визита в Великобританию или во время какого-то интервью…

Interpreter. Hello, I represent Gazeta.Ru, and my question is for Vladimir Lukin, who is a diplomat and a politician, and my question pertains to the new administration. I know that Trump has already visited Great Britain…

Калинин. И во время этого визита он делал определенные посылы о том, что, возможно, строить отношения с Россией имеет смысл именно исходя из нового договора об ограничении вооружений.

Владимир Дворкин. Вопрос! Пожалуйста, задайте вопрос.

Калинин. Ну, он довольно пространный. Мне нужно все-таки…

Владимир Дворкин. Не надо, пространного не нужно. У нас просто не хватит… Конкретный вопрос.

Калинин. Хорошо, хорошо, конкретней вопрос. Каким образом Трампу, США и России начать вести переговоры в условиях, когда внутри страны, США, и также внутри Великобритании общественное мнение настроено крайне негативно по отношению к России и любые вопросы, любые взаимоотношения не будут иметь отзыва внутри страны?

Interpreter. So, my question is, in view of that visit, when Trump has expressed an interest in improving relations with Russia, how can Trump, how can American and Russian administrations begin negotiations when the public opinion is so negative towards Russia in the United States and in Great Britain?

Лукин. Переговоры особенно полезны, когда отношения плохие. Когда отношения хорошие, переговоры не обязательны.

Interpreter. Negotiations are particularly useful when the relations are bad. When the relations are good, then there’s really no need for any negotiations.

Лукин. Конечно, внутренняя политика влияет на переговоры, но не всегда прямо и непосредственно.

Interpreter. And of course internal policy influences negotiations, but not always directly.

Лукин. И соглашения, причем очень важные, между нашими странами заключались, как я уже говорил, во времена холодной войны, когда отношения не были блестящими.

Interpreter. And the agreements between our two countries, the very important agreements, were concluded during the times of the Cold War, when our relations were very negative, too.

Лукин. Например, президент Никсон, когда он был кандидатом, он очень острые позиции занимал в отношении тогдашнего Советского Союза по ряду вопросов, а потом стал практически одним из авторов разрядки международной напряженности. Таким образом, связи тут особой нет, я не вижу здесь прямой связи.

Interpreter. And, if I remember, President Nixon, when he was a candidate, he had a very rigid position regarding the USSR, but then he was also one of the authors of the many measures that dissipated the tension between our two countries. So, I don’t really see any direct correlation there.

Лукин. Хорошая атмосфера создается в том числе и результативными хорошими переговорами и теми отношениями, которые в них, в результате их возникают, вот так я бы сказал.

Interpreter. Good atmosphere is created as a result of good negotiations and the kinds of relationships that spring forth through those negotiations.

Владимир Дворкин. Пожалуйста, вопросы! По возможности короткие задавайте вопросы.

Interpreter. More questions, please! Try and keep them concise.

Дмитрак. Здравствуйте! «Интерфакс», Дмитрак Наталья. Я бы не стала, наверно, адресовать свой вопрос кому-то конкретному, но мне интересно мнение как российской, так и американской стороны. Во-первых, как вы оцениваете в целом вероятность завладения ядерным оружием или создания его ИГИЛ? Может ли это стать какой-то точкой для совместных действий России и Америки и для, собственно, объединения и поиска общих интересов? И в принципе, какие конкретно должны быть шаги или условия для восстановления доверия между нашими странами? Спасибо.

Interpreter. Thank you, I represent Interfax, and I have a question both to the Russian and American counterparts, about the possibility of nuclear weapons ending up in the hands of ISIS. What can we do, what kind of joint actions can the United States and Russia do together, how can they unify in their search of solutions and common interests? What specific steps, do you think, can be taken to build more trust between these two countries?

Владимир Дворкин. Я могу ответить на этот вопрос и прежде всего сказать о том, что я хорошо запомнил слова Грэма Эллисона. Это известный политический деятель, он был когда-то помощником министра обороны.

Interpreter. I can answer that question. I can remember also a quote from Graham Allison, who was a well-known and renowned politician, who was an assistant to the Secretary of Defense.

Владимир Дворкин. Так вот, он сказал, что он поражен, удивлен тем, что еще десять лет тому назад не произошел ядерный теракт.

Interpreter. And he said that he is amazed that a nuclear terrorist act had not happened ten years ago.

Владимир Дворкин. Настоящий ядерный теракт, не с какой-то «грязной бомбой». Потому что изготовить простейшее взрывное ядерное устройство пушечного типа не представляет никакого труда. Прямо на месте. Для этого нужно килограмм 20-25 оружейного урана. И за большой промежуток времени накопить разным путем – представляется это возможным. Поэтому нужно очень сильно укрепить совместную работу по предотвращению ядерного терроризма, обеспечить глобальный контроль за нелегальным перемещением радиоактивных материалов. Здесь целый спектр задач, которые можно и должны мы решать при нормальных взаимоотношениях.

Interpreter. And I’m talking about here real nuclear terrorism, not a dirty bomb, that can easily be constructed using 20-25 kilograms of weapons-grade uranium that could easily be amassed in a relatively short period of time. So, what we need to think about is reinforcing the joint efforts and cooperation between our two countries, making illegal transportation of radioactive materials much more difficult to do, and all of that can become gradually, come out of more active negotiations and from more improved relations between our two countries.

Владимир Дворкин. Пожалуйста, вопросы. What is your question?

Interpreter. Next questions, please!

Andrew. Could we just add a little bit to that response, if we could, please?

Rohlfing. Yeah, from an American perspective?

Владимир Дворкин. Yes. Excuse me, excuse me.

Andrew. Joan wants to go first then.

Rohlfing. Yeah, let me just offer, and then I’d like to offer Andrew an opportunity to share as well, but… The critical materials needed to make a nuclear weapon are plutonium or highly enriched uranium. If the terrorists can’t acquire sufficient quantities of either of those materials, there will be no bomb, so the most important thing we can do to prevent nuclear terrorism is to ensure that those materials are secured to the highest possible standard wherever they exist. Today those materials exist in 23 countries around the world; while that’s still a significant challenge, that is less than half of the number of countries that had weapons-usable nuclear materials in the early 1990s, so we’ve made significant progress, and much of that progress was made in partnership, the U.S. and Russia working together through the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program and through other vehicles by which we both helped to bring plutonium and highly enriched uranium back to our countries, that had originated in our countries and then was pushed out around the world.

Although the relationship has been very tense between our two countries and nuclear cooperation has come to a total halt, cooperation on nuclear materials security, in 2014, there is, I would say, a sign of hope in that we work together to achieve the joint comprehensive plan of action, the Iran Agreement, which was a major achievement. And because the Nuclear Threat Initiative has been primarily focused on finding ways to prevent nuclear terrorism, we have worked hard over the last year to develop a menu of options for cooperation on nuclear security in a recently issued report, and Andrew, if I could hand off to you, to say a little bit about some of the findings in that report? Called “Pathways to Cooperation”.

Andrew. Yes, yes. So, two comments. First – about the Luxembourg report. One of the things that I think is so important and so beneficial about the report is that it talks about how to prevent not only nuclear terrorism, but also radiological terrorism, and so it very importantly highlights that we have to be concerned about both of those issues, as was just mentioned by the General. We are extremely worried about ISIS getting nuclear and radiological materials, and in fact we at NTI released a radiological report (and then I’ll talk about this new report), and we highlighted that, given the stated interest by terrorist groups and the widespread availability of radiological sources which are located in more than 150 countries, it is nothing short of a miracle that we have not yet seen a dirty bomb attack. So, we have to work together, the United States and Russia have to work together in third countries to prevent ISIS from getting these materials.

Back to what Joan Rohlfing said, we have just released a report last month, entitled “Pathways to Cooperation”, where we spent a year working with our Russian colleagues and developed a very detailed tangible list, a menu of 51 different projects where the U.S. and Russia could work together on nuclear and radiological security. One of the top recommendations, back to your very good question, is, one of the areas that is recommended is that the U.S. and Russia work together in Central Asia. Central Asia has a very strong economic focus in countries like Turkmenistan, where they have a very large gas